Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, and Privacy by Bell, Bernard W.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 6
Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime,
Undercover Operations, and Privacy
Bernard W. Bell
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Bernard W. Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, and Privacy, 11
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 151 (2002), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol11/iss1/6
THEATRICAL INVESTIGATION: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME,
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, AND PRIVACY
Bernard W. Bell*
The essence of theater is deception. Actors assume various roles to inforni-or
entertain the audience. Frequently, theater takes deception to a second level, in
which characters assume false identities or feign loyalty for various purposes.
Sometimes such artifices are employed to uncover truths that other seek to keep
secret. In My Fair Lady, Liza Doolittle assumes the role of an aristocratic lady to
test the effect of dialect upon aristocrats' perception of breeding.' In Roman
Holiday, a reporter fails to disclose his occupation to a frustrated young princess in
order to discover her innermost desires and chronicle a day in which the princess
acts as a commoner.' In Tootsie, an actor dresses as a woman to see whether he can
fool others into believing that he is.' Victor/Victoria takes such deception to a new
level, in which a woman, pretends to be a male entertainer, pretending to be a
female entertainer.4
Those who seek to ferret out white-collar wrongdoing- criminal investigators,
government regulators, journalists, private entities, and individual citizens -
emulate such theatrical techniques by using either assumed identities or confidential
informants to gather needed information. This article explores the privacy
implications of such techniques. I will first briefly outline the use of undercover
techniques. I will then suggest that courts use certain modes of privacy to define
the scope of individuals' privacy and, often, to enable individuals to define a sphere
of privacy for themselves. We will see that the modes of privacy courts most
heavily rely upon in defining entitlements against public and private intruders, the
modes focusing on physical location and subject matter, do not constrain
undercover investigation. Privacy protections can take the form of defining
confidential relationships or limiting the means intruders use to discover
information. Focusing on such alternative modes of privacy may provide a sounder
basis for reconciling the need for undercover techniques with citizens' need for
privacy.
I. USE OF UNDERCOVER TECHNIQUES
The use of undercover techniques is ubiquitous. We are most aware of law
* Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers School of Law - Newark.
MY FAIR LADY (Warner Bros. 1964).
2 ROMAN HOUDAY (Paramount Pictures 1953).
TooTsIE (Columbia Pictures 1982).
4 VIcTOR/VICTORIA (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1982).
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enforcement use of such techniques. However, other intruders sometimes rely upon
undercover techniques.
A. Government
The government uses undercover techniques in at least two capacities: criminal
and regulatory. In the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Supreme
Court has distinguished criminal investigation from administrative regulation.5
Thus, for example, the government possesses much greater authority to conduct
warrantless searches attendant administrative enforcement of Occupational Health
and Safety regulations or management of the country's borders than it does when
investigating routine criminal violations.6 Similarly, courts have interpreted the
Fifth Amendment to allow government-mandated record-keeping in regulatory
contexts that might otherwise violate the Fifth Amendment if imposed to facilitate
investigation of routine criminal conduct.7 Thus, it is helpful to consider the use of
undercover operations in criminal investigation and in regulatory enforcement
separately.
1. Criminal Investigation
Use of undercover techniques to reveal crimes, particularly white-collar crimes,
is common, though not well-documented One noted scholar, Gary Marx, has
' See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975) (finding that
searches for immigration purposes do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-75 (1973); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 665
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that random automobile stops without suspicion
violate the Fourth Amendment when conducted for criminal investigation purposes); see also
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-81 (2001) (addressing testing for illegal
narcotics during routine medical procedures); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32,
38-42 (2000) (addressing the use of drug interdiction checkpoints).
6 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 305, 320 (1978) (addressing workplace searches
conducted by OSHA inspectors to enforce workplace safety regulations); Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 883 n.8 (addressing interdiction of vehicles in areas near the nation's borders
by INS agents); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-75 (addressing search of automobile in
area near the nation's borders by INS agents).
7 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984);
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the
Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017-18 (1995). William Stuntz
discusses the dilemmas brought about by the dichotomy between criminal investigation and
regulation, noting that the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), seemed to
balance the individual's interests in privacy and the state's interest in the context of criminal
investigation, but threatened to nullify the government's power to regulate commercial
activity. Id. at 1029-34.8 See, e.g., Edward M. Neafsey, Why a Division of Criminal Justice?, 25 SETON HALL
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argued that deceptive investigative techniques have displaced the coercive means
of investigation.9 He has noted that constitutional doctrine developed since the
1960s has largely limited coercive investigative techniques such as searches or
intimidating methods of interrogation. Use of undercover techniques for
LEGIS. J. 107, 124-33 (2001) (discussing the undercover investigation of environmental
criminals); see also Cross-Border Fraud. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations,
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 162-63 (2001) (prepared statement
of Mary Ellen Warlow, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice) (discussing undercover operations directed at telemarketing fraud); Investigative
Practices of Inspectors General: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., &
Tech., House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 105th Cong. (June 24, 1997) (statement of Eleanor
Hill, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense) (discussing the use of undercover
techniques to investigate procurement and contracting fraud and other white-collar crimes),
1997 WL 345159. See generally GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN
AMERICA 37-40 (1988) (discussing the use of undercover techniques to investigate white-
collar crime).
A computerized search of the Andrews White-Collar Crime Reporter reveals a number
of cases resulting from undercover operations. E.g., Banker Pleads Guilty to Money
Laundering, 15 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 9, at 11 (Oct. 2001)
(describing the arrest of investment banker who agreed to launder money for an undercover
agent posing as an arms trader); DOT Employee Charged with Bribery, 15 White-Collar
Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 9, at 11 (Oct. 2001) (describing operation in which an
employee of the Maritime Administration accepted a bribe of NASCAR tickets from an
undercover agent posing as a contractor); Feds Charge Defense contractor With MailFraud,
16 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 2, at 7 (Feb. 2002) (discussing the
undercover investigation of a defense contractor for sale of uninspected and defective parts
for use in military planes); Feds Execute 100 Search Warrants in Software Copyright Probe,
16 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 1, at I (Jan. 2002) (describing Operation
Bandwidth, a sting operation in which software pirates provided undercover agents with
"over 100,000 computer files and 12,000 stolen software programs"); Indictment Stands for
E-Mailing DocumentAcross State Lines, 15 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No.
6, at 13 (July 2001) (describing operation in which a paralegal attempted to sell a trial plan
to an FBI agent posing as opposing counsel); Jury Convicts Diet Drug Doc on 14 Counts of
Selling Drugs Illegally, 13 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 5, at 12
(describing an undercover DEA investigation of a doctor prescribing weight-loss drugs to
patients who did not need them); Money Laundering lnvestigation Results in Guilty Plea, 16
White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 6, at 15 (June 2002) (describing undercover
IRS investigation); Organized Crime Implicated in Securities FraudArrests, 15 White-Collar
Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 7, at 17 (describing a year-long undercover operation by
the FBI, in cooperation with SEC and NASD); TNMan Convicted of Selling Illegal Gaming
Devices, Laundeing Money, 13 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 4, at 17
(describing a state undercover investigation of a company illegally manufacturing and
distributing video poker and slot machines); Va. Man Sentence for Selling Fake Asbestos
Training Certificates, 14 White-Collar Crime Rep. (Andrews Publ'n) No. 5, at 7 (describing
an undercover EPA investigation).
' MARX, supra note 8, at 47.
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conventional investigative purposes became particularly controversial as a result of
the FBI's ABSCAM investigation and with the use of undercover techniques in
white-collar investigations more generally. " Such techniques once again became
controversial as a result of Special Prosecutor Kenneth W. Starr's investigation of
President Bill Clinton, who used tapes Linda Tripp made of conversations with
Monica Lewinsky, encouraged Tripp to make additional recordings, and even
considered having Monica Lewinsky surreptitiously record her conversations with
President Clinton.' "
Law enforcement officials continue to rely heavily on undercover techniques
in narcotics investigations. Such techniques, however, are arguably also essential
in investigating certain white-collar offenses. White-collar crime may be virtually
impossible to uncover by nondeceptive means because many white-collar offenses
involve deception and abuse of legitimate authority.'2 In contrast, many traditional
crimes involve use of force, rather than deception.
2. Regulators
Regulatory agencies sometimes use undercover techniques for purposes of
assuring that regulated entities comply with legal requirements. 3 The goal may not
10 Id. at 8-10.
" Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use of
Deception as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 745, 810 n.295 (1999); Angela J.
Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 417 & nn. 103-04 (2001); Judy Keen & Kevin Johnson, Tripp Testifies
for a 4th Day, USA TODAY, July 10, 1998, at 1 IA (citing poll showing that most Americans
were against making tapes); Kathleen Parker, What Are Friends For? Why Did Tripp Tape
Conversations with Intern?, PEORIA J. STAR, Jan. 26, 1998 at A4 (editorializing that taping
conversations was as bad as an adulterous affair); see also Gary Fields, Privacy Watchers
Criticize Starr, Say Tactics Will Have Repercussions For Others, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,
1998, at 6A (noting that Starr's aggressive investigative tactics put the privacy issue in the
spotlight); Ruth Marcus, To Some in the Law Starr's Tactics Show a Lack of Restraint,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at Al (questioning whether Starr's investigation was too
aggressive).
12 See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits oflnvestigating and Prosecuting White Collar
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406
(1993) ("White collar crime.., involves a process of events, many of which are common
business occurrences that may be otherwise socially desirable. The white collar criminal's
goal is to conceal all evidence that a crime has been committed while preserving the patina
of legality surrounding the normal conduct of business.").
"3 See Bradley v. Med. Bd., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 491 & n. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("As
attested to by a supervising investigator for the Board, '[u]ndercover operations are routinely
used by the Medical Board ... to investigate complaints ... of overprescribing or drug
addiction....'); OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK AND AGENCY DIRECTORY § 3.11
(West, WESTLAW through June 2002) (discussing the use of undercover investigations by
[Vol. 11:151
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be criminal prosecution (though that is a possibility) 4 but rather disqualifying the
unqualified, preventing further violations, or perhaps compensating victims.'5
However, regulatory agencies possess much broader powers than criminal
investigators to conduct searches and coerce disclosure of incriminating
information. Moreover, the administrative search doctrine allows regulators (unlike
law enforcement officials) to conduct routine inspections of premises without
probable cause to believe a regulatory violation exists, much less that a crime has
been committed.' 6 The Fourth Amendment, as construed by the United States
Supreme Court, also allows for warrantless searches in pervasively regulated
industries. 7
The Fifth Amendment ordinarily constrains criminal investigators efforts to
obtain incriminating statements from suspected wrongdoers. However, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination often does not hamper regulators'
use of compulsory process to secure information regarding a regulatory violation.
Indeed, the federal government requires enormous amounts of record keeping for
a variety of purposes, including assessing the need for regulation and ensuring
regulated entities' compliance with legal obligations. Commercial enterprises in
state agencies); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 75.4 (West, WESTLAW through 2002 legislation)
(setting forth the rules governing undercover investigations of chiropractic examinations).
'4 E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'5 Bradley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483; MARX, supra note 8, at 86-88.
In late 1997, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced that it would
use undercover techniques to investigate employment discrimination. See Katherine Q.
Seelye, Agents to Go Undercover in Detection of Hiring Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, §
1, at 31.
16 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978) (finding a search to be
constitutional if an agency obtains a warrant based not on individualized suspicion, but rather
on a "showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of
a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources");
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (holding a warrant necessary for a fire inspection, but
that the warrant need not be based on individualized suspicion).
"7 Burger, 482 U.S. at 691 (inspection of automobile junkyard); Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594 (1981) (mine inspections); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(warrantless search of firearm dealer's business premises); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspection of liquor retailer's premises); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) ("[N]or do we question such accepted regulatory
techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or
marketing a product.").
"S OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MANAGING
INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION, at 8, 21 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/paperworkpolicyreport-final.pdf; see also Byers
v. California, 402 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
Such requirements would violate the Fifth Amendment if directed toward uncovering
conventional crimes rather than regulatory transgressions or regulated activity. Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (overturning conviction for failure to register and pay
20021
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pervasively regulated industries may be required to comply with subpoenas and
maintain records as a part of their permission to do business. 9
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not
likely prohibit the use of compulsory process to secure information indicating a
regulatory violation for a second reason. Entities engaged in commercial activities
will often be legally distinct from the particular individual whom its records may
incriminate. While individuals may interpose Fifth Amendment objections to
compulsory process seeking incriminating testimony from themselves, they
generally may not raise such objections when compulsory process requires a legally
distinct entities to produce incriminating records held by it.2"
All this might suggest less of a need for undercover operations in the regulatory
context because regulators possess more efficacious investigative powers.2'
Nevertheless, regulators do use undercover techniques. Indeed, sometimes
regulators and criminal investigators work together, blurring the line between
regulation and criminal investigation.2"
federal wagering tax); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965)
(overturning order requiring Communist Party members to register or face criminal penalty);
see also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85
(1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); John H. Mansfield, The Albertson
Case: Conflict Between the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need
for Information, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 103; Robert B. McKay, Self Incrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. (1967).
'9 Cal. Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (banking industry); United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 636-37 (1950) (Federal Trade Commission subpoena);
see also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948) (subpoena issued under authority
of the Emergency Price Control Act); Wilson v. United States 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)
(holding that custodian cannot raise Fifth Amendment claim to subpoena for "records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions
which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and the enforcement of
restrictions validly established"); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.11, at 178-80 (3d ed. 1994); Peter J. Henning, Testing
the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts
Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405,439-41 (1993). See generally RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 8.1, at 399 n.4 (3d ed. 1999)
(outlining extensive licensing regimes that impose compelled report filing requirements on
licensees).
20 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.12(b) (3d ed. 2000); see also
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976);
Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
HowFar Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405,415-39 (1993).
21 MARX, supra note 8, at 47 ("[Rlestrict police use of coercion, and the use of deception
increases. Restrict investigative behavior after an offense, and increased attention will be
paid to anticipating an offense.").




Journalists have also long engaged in undercover investigation.23 Two
renowned early undercover investigations involved Nellie Bly and Upton Sinclair.
Bly investigated the conditions at a New York City mental institution in the 1880s.
She did so by checking into a boarding house and acting strangely, prompting police
officers to take her to the mental institution for commitment. Bly acted normally
thereafter, but authorities at the institution continued to confine her. After ten days
Bly's editor secured her release. Bly wrote a first person account of her
incarceration.24 Upton Sinclair posed as a meatpacker to investigate the conditions
in slaughterhouses, and afterward wrote a highly acclaimed book-length expose.25
The rise of investigative reporting and broadcast journalism has spurred greater
use of undercover techniques. Broadcast journalism encourages use of undercover
techniques because it places greater demands on journalists for dramatic visual
images. Litigation arising out of ABC's use of undercover techniques to investigate
meat handling practices at a supermarket chain has sparked debate about journalistic
use of undercover techniques.2
6
ABC's PrimeTime Live decided to investigate conditions at Food Lion
supermarkets, after receiving allegations that the chain engaged in unsanitary
practices. Two PrimeTime Live producers, Lynn Litt and Susan Barnett applied for
jobs as meat packers in two separate Food Lion stores, using false identities and
providing falsified references. Once hired, Litt and Barnett observed various
unsanitary practices and recorded the unsanitary conditions and practices with
hidden cameras and tape recorders. Litt and Barnett recorded about forty-five hours
of material while working as Food Lion employees. ABC televised a story on
conditions at Food Lion featuring Litt and Barnett's surreptitiously made film and
audio tape.
Food Lion brought suit claiming breach of duty of loyalty, trespass, fraud, and
unfair trade practices. Food Lion proffered two breach of loyalty theories. First,
the two PrimeTime Live producers had breached their duty of loyalty as Food Lion
employees by providing information to ABC. Second, Litt and Barnett had
breached their duty of loyalty to Food Lion by performing their duties at Food Lion
less proficiently than they would have had they not been trying to gather damaging
Environmental Offenses, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 87, 89 (2000-2001).
23 Lyrisssa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law Should Do About It?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 231-32 (1998); David A. Logan,
"Stunt Journalism, "Professional Norms, and Public Mistrust of the Media, 9 U. FLA. J.L.
&PUB. POL'Y 151, 151-57 (2002).
24 This was not Bly's only undercover investigation. BROOKE KROEGER, NELLIE BLY:
DAREDEVIL, REPORTER, FEMINIST 87-88 (1994); Logan, supra note 23, at 152-53.
25 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Heritage Press 1965) (1906).
26 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
2002]
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information for a news story. The trespass claim was grounded on Litt and
Bamett's entry of non-public areas of Food Lion's facilities under false pretenses.
Food Lion's fraud claim alleged that the company had spent money hiring and
paying the two Primetime Live producers based upon their misrepresentations. The
unfair trade practices claim was based on the North Carolina Uniform Trade
Practices Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices." Food Lion alleged that Litt's misrepresentations on her
job application constituted prohibited "deceptive acts."
The jury awarded substantial damages, largely consisting of punitive damages.
The trial court reduced the damage award, but upheld the liability determination.
The court rejected the claim that Litt and Barnett had breached their duty of loyalty
by providing information to ABC, concluding that the information the two had
divulged was not the type of information protected by the breach of loyalty cause
of action. The court held that the second breach of loyalty claim (focused on Litt
and Barnett's failure to concentrate exclusively on their responsibilities at Food
Lion) stated a valid cause of action, but only a small portion of the damages award
was attributable to that breach of loyalty.
The Fourth Circuit upheld two aspects of the claim: breach of duty of loyalty
(based on Litt and Barnett's divided loyalties) and trespass, but noted that each had
resulted in merely nominal damages. It dismissed the unfair trade practices claim
because the deception ABC and its producers had engaged in was not generally
actionable under North Carolina law."
Journalists' goals in conducting undercover investigations differ from those of
both law enforcement officials and regulators. Journalists have little interest in
collecting evidence for criminal prosecution. Indeed, their interests are not limited
to uncovering illegal activity.28 Journalists' really seek exposure, whether the
matters exposed consist of unlawful activity or other activity of interest to their
audience.
Such exposure enables public discussion of certain practices and allows
democratic bodies to decide whether additional regulation or some other response
is appropriate.29 Such efforts also provide a more personal, individual benefit to
readers and viewers, in particular, allowing them to exercise autonomy. Some
media undercover investigations allow readers and viewers to learn about the true
qualities of the persons or entities with which they interact rather than the facade
27 Id. The case has spawned numerous law review articles and popular commentaries.
28 Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (hidden-camera examination of
the work of telephone psychics); Howard Kurtz, Gifford Tumbles into Tabloid Trap: Globe's
Tactics in Liason Cause a Stir, WASH. POST, May 17, 1997, at H I (investigation of celebrity
Frank Gifford's marital fidelity to his television personality spouse Kathie Lee Gifford)).
29 The prime example is the enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-
384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), after Upton Sinclair's undercover expos6 of the meat-packing
industry. See SINCLAIR, supra note 25.
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they maintain. Thus, journalists' justification for employing undercover methods
resembles those offered by law enforcement. Specifically, journalists cannot
otherwise obtain some information because those who engage in illegal or improper
conduct, particularly white-collar miscreants, will deceive known outsiders.3"
While some undercover investigations pursued by journalists have been
elaborate,3 ' almost all are much simpler than the more ambitious law enforcement
undercover investigations. The expense, danger, and potential need to violate the
law sometimes required by effective undercover operations (and the wiretap laws'
more stringent limitations onjournalists) restrictjournalists to a greater degree than
law enforcement officials.32 Journalists, however, may conduct such investigations
independently or in conjunction with law enforcement or regulators.
C. Other Private Citizens
People who are neitherj ournalists nor government officials employ undercover
techniques in a variety of contexts. For example, fair housing organizations use
testers to determine whether realtors treat minority and non-minority clients
equally.33 Employers may use decoys to test the integrity, or even the courtesy, of
their employees.34 So far, such private "stings" have not become as controversial
as law enforcement "stings" or journalist hidden-camera investigations.
II. THE LAW OF PRIVACY
The protection provided by the law of privacy differs depending on whether the
source of the potential intrusion is a governmental or nongovernmental entity.
Government intrusion into privacy is constrained by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, limiting government searches and seizures.35 Fourth
30 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Undercover, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1185, 1206 (2000); see also Lori Keeton, Note, What Is Really Rotten in the Food Lion
Case: Chilling the Media's Unethical Newsgathering Techniques, 49 FLA. L. REV. Ill
(1997); ABC PrimeTime Live: Hidden Camera, Hard Choices (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 12, 1997) (discussing the Food Lion case with jurors).
31 For example, the Chicago Sun-Times purchased and operated a bar to document
corruption among various inspectors employed by the City of Chicago. See ZAY N. SMITH
& PAMELA ZEKMAN, THE MIRAGE (1979); Zay N. Smith & Pamela Zekman, The Mirage
Takes Shape, 18 COLUM. JOURNAUSM REV. 51 (1979).
32 See Bell, supra note 11, at 778-79. For instance, presumably no news organization
would have conducted an operation like ABSCAM, in which informants offered bribes to
members of Congress, or Operation Greylord, involving investigation of judicial bribery.
3 See Bell, supra note 11, at 835.
3 Peter Scott, Indifferent Clerks, Surly Cashiers. What Is to Be Done?, WALLST. J., June
29, 2001, at W17 (discussing the $435 million "secret shopper" industry).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; LAFAVE Er AL, supra note 20, §§ 3.1-. 10; Bell, supra note
2002]
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Amendment analysis involves a two-step process. First, a court must determine
whether law enforcement officers have breached any reasonable expectation of
privacy - in other words, the court must determine whether the investigative target
has any cognizable privacy interest at all.36 If the court concludes that the target did
possess a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court must then decide whether the
Fourth Amendment permits the breach of that privacy expectation - because either
the police have secured a warrant after establishing probable cause, or the breach
fits within one of numerous judicially recognized exceptions to the warrant and.
probable cause requirements. 37
The Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination may also protect
privacy in certain circumstances.3" The substantive criminal law doctrine of
entrapment, absolving defendants when law enforcement officials have involved
themselves too substantially in the criminal activity for which they seek to prosecute
the defendant, can also protect privacy in certain circumstances.39 In addition, given
the limited nature of constitutional protections of privacy against government
intrusions, Congress has enacted federal statutes that supplement Fourth
Amendment protections of privacy - statutes that, for example, limit government
wiretapping or government access to bank records." Other statues limit government
disclosure of private information in government databases without consent. 41 As
11, at 755-56.
36 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 357.
" Robert Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 245 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
39 Some prosecutions based on particularly troublesome undercover operations have
foundered on entrapment or related constitutional defenses. See, e.g., State v. Lively, 921
P.2d 1035, 1046, 1048-49 (Wash. 1996) (dismissing prosecution against narcotics addict
who sold drugs to a confidential informant, explaining that the police had deprived the
criminal defendant of due process by, inter alia, authorizing a confidential informant to
attend narcotics anonymous meetings to lure recovering drug addicts to engaged in illegal
drug transactions). Ultimately, however, entrapment law focuses on the defendant's
predisposition to commit a crime, not the legitimacy of police deception. See United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973) (stating that the entrapment defense was not
intended to allow the federal judiciary to punish "overzealous law enforcement," or exercise
a ."chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve," but
rather the entrapment defense rests on the principle that Congress could not have intended
criminal punishment for a defendant who was induced by the government to commit an
offense). See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 5.1-.2; WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 1986); MARX, supra note 8, at 188-90.
40 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422) (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868-72 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000)).
41 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (covering
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noted above, judicially developed constitutional doctrines distinguish regulation and
criminal investigation so as to afford regulators enhanced powers to obtain
information from private citizens.42
The protection of privacy against nongovernmental intruders, whether
journalists or other private citizens, rests upon an amalgam of statutory and
common law. Private actors, unlike governmental actors, are not subject to
constitutional constraints - thus the Fourth and Fifth Amendments generally do not
limit their intrusions. 3 A cluster of common-law causes of action directly protect
various aspects of privacy. In particular, courts have recognized four "privacy"
causes of action: intrusion into seclusion, disclosure of private facts, false-light
privacy, and appropriation of likeness."' Generally, a person commits the tort of
intrusion if: (1) he "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns," and (2) the intrusion
"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."' 5 Secretly planting a listening
device in a married couple's bedroom provides the classic example of such intrusive
behavior. The intrusion cause of action focuses on the means with which the
defendant obtained the information, and indeed the plaintiff need not even prove
dissemination of any information discovered as a result of the intrusion." By
contrast, the other privacy causes of action turn on the disclosure of information or
images rather than their acquisition.
The disclosure of private facts cause of action allows individuals to recover
compensation when others publicize their private matters. To prevail on such a
claim, plaintiff must show that the defendant gave publicity to an aspect of
plaintiff's private life, that such publicity would be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person," and that the publicized information "is not of legitimate
concern to the public."' 7
records maintained by federal agencies); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725) (covering records
maintained by state motor vehicle agencies).
42 See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
4' Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-77 (1921) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and was
not intended as a limitation upon nongovernmental entities); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d
995, 1012 (R.I. 1984) ("[T]he constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures applies only to governmental conduct.") (quoting State v. Eiseman, 461 A.2d 369,
374 (1983)); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3.1(h).
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (creating these
categories); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) (adopting this
categorization).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
46 Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111-12, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 658D.
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The false light privacy cause of action supplements defamation liability and
arguably does little to protect privacy. False light privacy focus on false statements
about a person that do not harm reputation but convey a misimpression about the
individual's personality and attributes.4" Thus, to make out a claim for false light
privacy, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has given publicity to the
plaintiff in a way that puts him before the public in a false light, that such false light
would be highly offensive to the reasonable person, and that the defendant acted
with knowledge or reckless disregard with respect to the falsity of the publicized
matter. One prominent false light privacy claim involved the use of a photograph
depicting a child killed by a car to illustrate a story about pedestrian carelessness,
even though the child's injury had not been due to her negligence."'
Finally, the appropriation of name or likeness cause of action seeks to vindicate
a person's interest in avoiding nonconsensual commercial exploitation of her
identity.5" The classic example of a situation covered by the tort is one in which a
company uses a photograph of a person's face or their name to advertise a product."'
States vary in the common-law privacy causes of action they recognize.52 For
example, New York recognizes only the privacy cause of action for appropriation
of likeness. 3
Other common-law causes of action can vindicate individuals' interests in
privacy, even though the causes of action themselves are not focused on protecting
privacy. Some plaintiffs have asserted common-law trespass and breach of
confidence causes of action against intrusion.54 Invoking real property rights to
'8 Id. § 652D cmt. b.
'9 Leverton v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
S0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 658C.
"' Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (addressing use of
an infant girl's photograph with the caption "Flour of the Family" in advertisement for
defendant's flour); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (addressing
use ofplaintiff's photograph and name in newspaper advertisement for defendant's insurance
company). Though the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a common-law
cause of action in Robertson, the New York legislature created a statutory cause of action in
response to the decision. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1, 2 (codified at N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50, 51 (1984)).
52 See generally 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS § 12.2.2 (3d ed. 2002); 62A AM. JUR. 2DPrivacy §§ 5-7 (1990).
13 N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (1984); 62A AM. JUR. 2D § 12; see also supra note
49.
4 See Bell, supra note 11:
At common law, employees owed their employer a duty of loyalty. That duty of
loyalty included an obligation to keep confidential the employer's valuable trade
secrets. Thus, employers have long possessed a right to compensation for any
damage resulting from an employees' disclosure of trade secrets.
Id. at 759 (citations omitted).
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exclude strangers from one's property can effectively secure one's privacy while
one remains secluded on his or her property." Similarly, to the extent that an
intruder becoming an employee of the target company, a breach of confidence cause
of action might be invoked to prevent disclosure of information the intruder obtains
as a result. While the cause of action is focused on protecting economic interests,
namely trade secrets, it could potentially be invoked to protect the firm's "privacy"
interest.56
The federal and state governments have also enacted statutes protecting various
aspects ofprivacy." For example, federal statutes prohibit private individuals from
surreptitiously intercepting conversations. Federal statutes also require entities to
keep banking account information, video rental records, and educational records
confidential. Statutes also place limitations on the dissemination of consumer credit
information."8 Recently promulgated Department of Health and Human Services
regulations require medical personnel to keep patient records confidential. 9
III. THE MODES OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
Defining the contours of individuals' legitimate expectations of privacy in
personal information presents courts and legislatures with a daunting task. In other
words, specifying the types of information concerning individuals that should be
designated "private," and thus immune from snooping and discussion by others,
entails great difficulties. Whether such information should be recognized as
"private" surely depends heavily on the circumstances - an individual's HIV-
positive status may properly be deemed "private" vis-a-vis employers, neighbors,
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 158 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 67-84 (5th ed. 1984).
56 Evidentiary privileges also may play a role in protecting privacy. See infra notes
181-94 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 10-618, 102 Stat. 3195
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710) (preventing video rental outlets from disclosing rental and
sales information); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102
Stat. 646 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2001) (limiting employers' ability to subject employees
andjob applicants to polygraph tests); Electronic Communications PrivacyActof 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510) (regulating the conditions under
which interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized); Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1232g) (restricting educational institutions ability to disclose educational and related
information of students and their parents); Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act,
1990 Pa. Laws 584-148 (codified at 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7601-7612 (2002)).
" Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681 t) (regulating the information creditors may disclose).
'9 E.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed.
Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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and the general public, but not vis-a-vis past, present, and future sexual partners.
Moreover, individuals have vastly different privacy preferences, and the
information or activities they wish to keep private may vary greatly. Some may
have little desire to keep their sexual practices or their bodies private while others
may care little about maintaining the confidentiality of their financial
circumstances. Given the difficulty in setting forth facts or activities that should be
designated "private," legislatures and courts tend to use certain proxies for privacy
in protecting citizens' privacy interests. In a sense, then, one can identify five
modes of privacy that courts and legislatures focus upon in seeking to establish and
preserve a sphere of privacy for citizens.
The first mode of privacy protection is space - i.e., physical location. In
particular, privacy protection can focus on particular places. Thus privacy law
could provide protection by limiting physical intrusions upon individuals when in
certain locations or, more generously, by specifying that activities taking place in
particular locations are protected from outside interference (whether governmental
or nongovernmental). For example, the law could establish "the home" as a place
which neither law enforcement officers, regulators, journalists, nor potential non-
media private intruders can enter without establishing probable cause to believe that
illegal activities are occurring therein. The law might also provide that activities
within the home are less subject to regulation or interference than they would be if
conducted outside the home. We will see that the law indeed grants heightened
protection to homes in ways that serve to protect privacy.
A second mode of privacy involves means of communications - privacy law
could focus on protecting certain types of communications. Protecting
communications from breach by outside parties might enable citizens to protect
some of their confidences. In addition, particular methods of communicating might
be especially highly valued and, thus, receive more rigorous protection than others.
Thus, for instance, the law might provide heightened protection from intrusion for
conversations conducted by telephone or in person. Though the means of
communications might seem an odd proxy for privacy, sometimes both courts and
legislatures have sought to protect particular means of communications.
A third mode of privacy protection focuses on controlling the means of
intrusion. Under this approach, privacy is protected by restricting the use of some
techniques employed to intrude into others' privacy. Thus, we might find that use
of mechanical devices to record conversations is subject to special regulation
because of the danger such conduct poses to privacy. Similarly, society might
consider particularly troubling the use of polygraphs (and other devices used to
measure physiological responses) or invasive surgical procedures to uncover
relevant information about a person.6" Thus, certain information might be sought
60 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that intrusion into human
body is particularly offensive and may only be undertaken upon "a clear indication that in
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and disseminated, so long as an intruder does not employ a particularly troubling
means of intrusion.
Fourth, privacy protection can focus on the subject-matter. Thus, courts and
legislatures could establish privacy rules declaring certain types of information
inappropriate for disclosure. For instance, a legislature might proscribe publication
of the intimate details of sexual relationships or photographs of urination6 without
the consent of the subject of the account or photograph. This fourth mode of
privacy thus does not focus on protecting a specific physical location from intrusion
or limiting the manner in which information is obtained.
Fifth, we might ground privacy in the protection of certain relationships. Some
relationships might merit special legal protection - the doctor-patient and cleric-
penitent relationships for example. Even if a relationship is unworthy of a
conventional testimonial privilege, it might nevertheless warrant giving one or both
of the parties to the relationship the power to exercise control over information
imparted in the course of the relationship. Thus regulation using this fifth mode of
privacy will seek to protect privacy by giving individuals some control over those
with whom they share their private lives.
As I will discuss below, there is a sixth mode of privacy that is in some ways
a combination of those outlined above. That mode of privacy focuses on databases
and protects privacy by limiting access to and use of databases. The database mode
of privacy merits at least brief exploration given the number of modem statutes that
focus on database protection.
I will explore the manner in which various aspects of privacy law reflect each
of the modes of privacy. I will also outline the difficulty that undercover operations
pose with regard to statutes and common law doctrines embodying each of these
fact such evidence will be found"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) ("A compelled
surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy
and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to
produce evidence of a crime."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that
forcing a defendant to vomit two capsules of morphine that he had swallowed was a search
in violation of his right to due process); see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension
of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1649-50 (1998) (noting
that courts have held that probable cause and warrants are not by themselves sufficient to
justify a surgical search).
6 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); Haynes v.
Alfred Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) ("There are few activities in our society more
personal and private than the passing of urine.... It is a function traditionally performed
without public observations; indeed its performance in public is generally prohibited by law
as well as social custom."), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (involving "indecent
exposure," namely the revealing of the underwear of woman whose clothes were
unexpectedly blown up by air vents).
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modes of privacy.
A. Physical Location as a Mode of Privacy
The primary protections against potential governmental and nongovernmental
intruders focus on physical location. The U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has, until relatively recently, focused on real property concepts.62 As
some have noted critically, privacy receives protection because real property
most particularly the right to exclude others from private property - receives
protection.63 If a person lacks property interests, that person probably can secure
little privacy. Concommitently, the more property one possesses, the greater one's
opportunity to secure privacy. Indeed, the Supreme Court's focus on property in
defining privacy rights was so pronounced that the Court felt compelled to make
clear in Katz v. United States,64 and repeatedly thereafter, that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places." '65 The Fourth Amendment, and thus the
Court's property-focused interpretation of that Amendment, governs both
investigatory searches and regulatory searches. Albeit, the Court has crafted an
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement that sometimes allows
regulators to intrude upon private real property without probable cause or a
warrant.66
Location-based privacy approaches defining the scope of privacy need not
exclusively turn on real property interests. For example, use of hidden cameras in
public bathroom stalls constitutes a search requiring probable cause and a warrant
(or the equivalent) because users of such facilities possess a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the stall while they occupy it, regardless of their lack of any real
property claim to dominion over the stall.67 Similarly, in a few circumstances, a
62 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[O]ur Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.").
63 E.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDrnON 38-78 (1958) ("The only efficient
way to guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is
private property, a privately owned place to hide in.").
14 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65 Id. at 351. However, real property rights do not fully define the expectation ofprivacy.
Thus, in the context of police intrusions into open fields owned by a private individual, the
Court has declared that the law of trespass confers protections from intrusion broader than
the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court held, law enforcement
officials may trespass on real property without violating any reasonable expectation of
privacy and, accordingly, law enforcement officials need neither a warrant nor probable
cause to enter an open field. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 & n.15 (1984).
66 Thus, the Court recognizes an entitlement to privacy based on property ownership but
allows law enforcement to frustrate the legitimate privacy expectation by means other than
the traditional manner of the issuance of a warrant and/or the existence of probable cause.
"' People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing privacy
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person may own property but lack a reasonable expectation of privacy that
precludes others from entering the property to observe them.6 s
Courts have employed similar property-based privacy approach with regard to
private intruders: the intruder's physical location is often central to intrusion against
seclusion claims.69 If ajournalist obtains personal information about a person while
in a place open to the public, the aggrieved individual ordinarily cannot prevail on
a privacy claim.7" However, if the journalist is in an area barred from the general
public, gathering personal information can form the grounds of liability.7 ' A
location may be unavailable to the public for several reasons, but often such
inaccessability results from private property owners exercising their power to
exclude. Thus, the intrusion into seclusion cause of action may offer limited
privacy protection because private areas may be somewhat accessible to people who
remain in public areas and use their natural or mechanically enhanced powers of
observation. Moreover, the location-focused quality of common-law intrusion
claims makes extremely difficult successful assertion of a privacy cause of action
against extensive and intrusive monitoring that occurs in public places.72
interest in rest stop stalls during periods of occupation); State v. Casconi, 766 P.2d 397, 399
(Or. Ct. App. 1988) ("'The final bastion of privacy is to be found in the area of human
procreation and excretion' and '[if] a person was entitled to any shred of privacy, then it is
to privacy in these matters."') (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
(decided under Oregon state constitution). See generally Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation,
Search and Seizure: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public Restroom, 74 A.L.R.4TH
508 (1989) (discussing judicial treatment of claims to privacy in public restrooms).
6s See supra note 65.
69 Bell, supra note 11, at 767 & nn.95-97.
70 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469,490-92 (Cal. 1998) ("The
tort [of intrusion] is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude in the place . . . ."); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1280-81 & n.20 (Nev. 1995); Andrew Jay
McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theor of Liability for Intrusions
in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1036-41 (1995). See generally C. THOMAS DIENES
Er AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW §§ 12-2, 12-4(c)(2) (2d ed. 1997).
71 See, e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 492. For instance, when deciding whether journalists
had tortiously intruded upon an accident victim, the Shulman court focused on the
observations that could be made from the highway, the presence of any bystanders at the
accident scene, and the statements such bystanders could hear. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at
491; see also Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78, 684-85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (allowing plaintiff's claim against a television crew who entered her home without
permission to film emergency personnel attempting to revive her husband).
72 See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 NE.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
A few cases have been successful, but often because the surveillance was visible. Such
visible surveillance adds an element of harassment and intimidation to the public scrutiny.
See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 & n. 11, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizing an
implied right of action against paparazzi for violating criminal harassment statute); Wolfson
v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (enjoining reporters from "harassing,
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A well-known case, Nader v. General Motors Corp.," illustrates the difficulty
of prevailing upon an intrusion claim arising from public surveillance. The case
involved wide-ranging allegations that General Motors had harassed consumer
advocate Ralph Nader. Nader alleged that General Motors "hired people to shadow
[him] and keep him under surveillance." On one occasion, he claimed, his General
Motors "shadow" followed him sufficiently closely to observe "the denomination
hounding, following, intruding, frightening, terrorizing, or ambushing" certain corporate
executives whose salaries the reporters were investigating); Pinkerton Nat'l Detective
Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119, 122-23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (affirming claim of
invasion of privacy where neighbors' opinions of the plaintiff were negatively affected by
witnessing the defendant's constant investigation of the plaintiff); Le Mistral v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 n.l, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (affirmingjury verdict
against television station that sent a camera crew into an upscale restaurant without
permission, alarming patrons); Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
139 N.W. 386,389-90 (Wis. 1913) (finding "open or rough shadowing" to be defamatory);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652B cmt. d (1977) (stating that an intrusion may arise
from a "course of hounding the plaintiff'). For a proposal to develop a cause of action for
privacy even in a public place, see McClurg, supra note 70, at 1055-59.
Similarly, it is hard to make out a claim against law enforcement officers' surreptitious
use of facial recognition technology in public places because anyone who is scanned is in
open public. See Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowd for Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2001, at Al. However, at least prior to September 11, 2001, there was a
chorus of criticism over the use of video monitors and face recognition technology to identify
people on public streets. Ross Kerber, Technology & Innovation: Face-Recognition
Software Spurs Privacy Fears, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2001, at C 1; Miki Meek, You Can't
Hide Those Lying Eyes in Tampa: Street Cameras Spark a Privacy Debate, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug, 6, 2001, at 20; Rick Montgomery, Face-Recognition Software Getting
a Hard Look Since Sept. 11, KANSAS CrrY STAR, Nov. 25 2001, at A 1; Robert O'Harrow Jr.,
Matching Faces With Mug Shots; Software for Police, Others Stirs Privacy Concerns,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at Al.
The discomfort with face scans in public street may be explained, in part, by the
asymmetry in positions of the various actors involved. The watched, i.e., citizens using the
streets, cannot observe the watcher. If a real person is doing the watching, individuals using
that public place may at least determine when the watcher has focused upon them. In
addition, the watcher runs the risk that the object of his interest may subject him to the same
treatment. Also, individuals being watched by an actual person may confront the watcher and
ask what he is doing and why; if done in a sufficiently public place, such a confrontation
might enlist the help of others nearby. This qualitative difference between real-person and
mechanized surveillance has not prevented the Supreme Court from equating the two forms
of surveillance. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983) (treating
surveillance of a vehicle via a secretly planted transmitter as the equivalent of surveillance
by actual people along the vehicle's route).
Moreover, face-recognition technology has the potential for invading people's "space."
A camera operator using zoom technology could focus in on details observable by the naked
eye only if the observer were staring intently at the person watched from inches away.
" 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
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of the bills he was withdrawing from his account."74 The court explained that
[a] person does not automatically make public everything he does merely
by being in a public place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank
did not give anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he
was withdrawing. On the other hand, if plaintiff acted in such a way as
to reveal [the] facts to any casual observer, then, it may not be said that
the appellant intruded into his private sphere."
Though the court phrased its analysis in terms of the subject matter to which
intruders may direct their attention, by suggesting that information regarding the
amount of a person's withdrawals from his bank account is a private matter,
suggesting that the court really adopts a location-based analysis. In Nader, as in the
public bathroom cases mentioned earlier, the location-focused analysis does not turn
on strict application of property concepts. As the court explained, even in a public
place we may have a small area around us that social custom defines as ours, and
that we may ask others to keep inviolate.76 Among other things, such personal space
enables individuals to access purses or wallets that contain personal, private matters
without revealing those matters to others. If the subject matter, withdrawal of
money from a bank, were truly the crux of the Nader court's analysis, a casual
observer who could see the denominations of the currency Nader was withdrawing
because of Nader's carelessness in failing to keep the currency from sight could
neither stare at Nader to discover the denominations of the currency Nader held nor
communicate information about Nader's withdrawal of money (even that gained
from casual observation). The Nader Court surely did not intend to establish such
a principle.
From another perspective too, physical space often assumes central importance
in privacy law. Courts (or legislatures) may sometimes characterize conduct as
public or private depending on the nature of the location in which that conduct
occurs.77 For example, in Stanley v. Georgia."8 the Supreme Court precluded the
14 Id. at 771.
75 Id.
76 See id. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community
and Selfin the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957,971-74 (1989) (discussing the role
of the social construct of private space in shaping intrusion law).
77 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("[A] state has no business telling a man
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.").
Indeed, the Court invalidated contraception laws, in part, because enforcement of such
statutes would require law enforcement officials to invade "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) ("Would we allow the
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government from enforcing laws prohibiting possession of obscene material against
a man who held such proscribed obscenity within the confines of his home. The
Court held that the government could generally prohibit possession of obscene
materials outside of the home and could punish acquisition of such materials -
even if intended for use in the home - but could not prosecute the homeowner for
possession once he brought the contraband inside his home.79 As the Court
explained, "whatever may be thejustification for other statutes regulating obscenity,
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home.""0
The controversial Alaska Supreme Court decision in Ravin v. State8 provides
a second example of a judicial determination that otherwise illegal activity may
become constitutionally protected private conduct because it occurs within the
home. In Ravin, the court held that, even though the state may prohibit possession
and the purchase and sale of marijuana in general, the government may not
prosecute an individual for consuming marijuana at home.82 The court based its
decision on the Alaska Constitution's right of privacy clause, finding that the clause
protected consumption of marijuana so long as it occurred in one's home. 3 This
view that conduct more easily qualifies as private if it occurs within the home may
explain the reaction, hyperbolically described as "global ridicule," to a Friendship
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital
relationship."); id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The Connecticut statutes here involved
deal with a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy - that of the marital
relationship and the marital home.") (emphasis added). Of course, this argument was not
solely rooted in place but was also rooted in protection of a special relationship, namely that
of husband and wife. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1026 n.43.
78 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
71 Id. at 568.
o Id. at 565.
81 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
82 Id. at511.
83 Id. at 504. Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,676-77 (1962) (declaring
unconstitutional a lawcriminalizing narcotics addiction), with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
532-37 (1968) (refuising to extend the Robinson holding to punishment ofa chronic alcoholic
for public drunkenness, in part because Texas had not "attempted to regulate appellant's
behavior in the privacy of his own home"). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195
(1986) ("Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not immunized whenever it occurs in
the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession or use of illegal drugs, do not escape
the law where they are committed at home.").
However, when the conduct a resident engages in at home becomes commercialized,
courts often consider the conduct to have been transformed from "private" to "public." See,
e.g., State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1360 (1983) (holding that prostitution occurring within
a private residence is not protected by Hawaii's constitutional right of privacy). Compare
Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511, with , Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975) (commercial
sale of narcotics to another in home not protected by the Alaska right of privacy).
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Heights, Maryland ordinance banning smoking at home if secondary smoke escapes
the home and poses health risks to those outside. 4
Thus, certain places receive a heightened, but not absolute, privacy protections.
As suggested above, the home has traditionally been the place where privacy
interests are strongest.85 Perhaps the home receives such heightened protection
because of the types of activities individuals tend to engage in at home. Many of
the most private aspects of life take place in, or are at least centered around,
residences. Moreover, the home is the locus of personal life rather than commercial
life. Courtsjustifiably tend to view commercial life as less private; therefore, courts
accord commercial enterprises far less robust Fourth Amendment protection.8 6
Much of the more limited Fourth Amendment protection in the regulatory
environment stems from the commercial nature of the typical premises subject to
regulatory intrusions.8 7
84 Jo Becker, Global Ridicule Extinguishes Montgomery's Anti-Smoking Bill, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al; Jo Becker, Smokers Told to Fetter Their Fumes, WASH. POST,
Nov. 21, 2001, at Al.
Similarly, those who visit a residence, as opposed to a business establishment, have less
of a right to impose upon their hosts the obligation to keep the premises free from physical
hazards. Thus, visitors to a commercial establishments' public areas and individuals invited
onto premises for commercial purposes qualify as "invitees" and have a right to expect
landowners to exercise reasonable care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1977).
Social guests to residences, however, must take the premises as they find them, and the host
ordinarily must merely disclose dangerous conditions. Id. at § 342. Granted, several
jurisdictions have jettisoned the rigidity of this traditional approach. Nevertheless,
landowners' freedom to act on their own property despite the risk of injury to those who
come onto their land is unusually pronounced when the property is a private residence.
Compare id., with id. at § 332. Generally, the duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm to
others is much greater than the duty the law imposes on landowners with regard to social
visitors. Id. at § 342.
85 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a search warrant to
support thermal scanning of a home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980)
(asserting that being arrested in your home is such a substantial invasion that a warrant is
required, unless there are exigent circumstances); NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-15
(1970). See generally LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 20, § 3.2(c); Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man's
Home is his Castle?: Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175-183
(2002).
86 See Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227,235-39,237 n.4 (1986) (allowing aerial
surveillance of large industrial complex, but suggesting that the result would be different as
to "an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most
heightened").
87 Administrative searches, however, are not invariably limited to businesses. See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. State, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Some nonresidential locations receive heightened protection, in part to protect privacy
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Undercover techniques defeat location-based protection to the extent that
location-based protection focuses on ensuring that owners control physical access
to their property.88 The inefficacy of location-based protection against undercover
intruders stems from such intruders' use of deception rather than coercion. The
intruder uses deception to obtain the property owner's consent to enter her property,
and consent is a standard defense to Fourth Amendment and common-law trespass
claims.89 Courts could hold that deception vitiates such consent in general.9" While
interests. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the sanctity of
newsrooms. While refusing to accord newsrooms special protections, the Court has specified
that law enforcement officials may search newsrooms for evidence of crimes committed by
third parties only if they observe the Fourth Amendment with "scrupulous exactitude."
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 485 (1965)). In response to the limited protections the Court established in Zurcher,
Congress enacted a statute which provided more protection by further limiting law
enforcement searches of newsrooms. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440,
94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994)). Some states have gone even farther
still in protecting newsrooms. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL, MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 665-66 (6th ed. 2000) (describing state statutory response to Zurcher).
Admittedly, the impetus for severely restricting newsroom searches is not really journalists'
privacy concerns, but the detrimental effects such searches have on journalists' ability to
gather and disseminate news.
88 Individual claims ofbreach ofphysical privacy by deception often challenge residential
intrusions. However, some cases have involved individuals' claims of privacy in their office
space. In State v. Hayes, the plaintiff argued that the due process clauses of the federal and
Vermont constitutions prohibit the government from conducting undercover investigations
in private workplaces absent a reason to believe that illegal activity is afoot. State v. Hayes,
752 A.2d 16, 18 (Vt. 2000). The Court rejected the argument, relying on a consent rationale.
See also Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
Technological advance can have a similar effect because it allows law enforcement
officers to penetrate physical boundaries and physical space. See infra note 104.
89 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 892A(1) (1979) ("One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to
invade his interest cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
from it."); id. § 167-175 (addressing the effect of consent in trespass claims); see also
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3.10.
90 Indeed, the Restatement of Torts suggests that an actor's consent has not effect if given
based on the recipient's misrepresentation of the nature of the consenter's interest being
invaded or the harm expected as a result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979).
The courts have not applied this approach to trespass claims involving journalists. Judge
Posner discusses the Restatement in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies and
concludes that the deception in that case did not interfere with the interest that the tort of
trespass is designed to protect. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir.
1995).
No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life were publicized in the
present case. There was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers
recorded their own conversations with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians.
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a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights is permissible, waiver
under a misimpression might not be. The constitutional limitations on judicial
acceptance of guilty pleas and police interrogation illustrate the principle. A court
may accept a defendant's guilty plea only after conducting a lengthy plea allocution,
during which the judge ensures that the defendant understands the rights being
renounced.9 Police interrogations must be preceeded by a Miranda warning if the
subject is the target of the investigation.92 Courts could employ a similar approach
to constrain investigators' physical intrusions.93 For reasons that I will discuss
later,94 courts have abjured that approach when addressing both governmental and
nongovernmental intrusions."
There was no violation of the doctor-patient privilege. There was no theft, or
intent to steal, trade secrets; no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet; no
noisy or distracting demonstrations.
Id. Note that Posner's analysis in Desnick touches upon almost all of the modes of privacy
discussed herein: physical location (no invasion of"private space"), means ofcommunication
(no eavesdropping on private conversation), means of intrusion (no disruption of decorum),
subject matter (no publicizing of embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life), and
relationships (no violation of the doctor-patient privilege).
Posner suggests more generally that judicially permitted deceptions often can be viewed
as not vitiating the interest protected by the tort cause of actions that plaintiffs seek to assert.
Id.
9' LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20 at § 20.4(bHe).
92 Id. §§ 6.5, 6.8; see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (holding that
waiver of the right to counsel cannot be established where the defendant spoke with an
undisclosed undercover informant because waiver is valid only if defendant is aware that he
is waiving his right to counsel before "a [g]overnment agent expressly commissioned to
secure evidence"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (holding that police did not
violate a defendant's Miranda rights when the defendant voluntarily revealed the location of
a weapon to police after he was read his rights). Although, as some have pointed out,
deception is not eliminated in the police interrogation situation even with regard to Miranda
warnings, see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the
Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 785-88 (1997), Miranda does establish some requirement of a
knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. At least in the interrogation context, the suspect
knows he is interacting with the police; in the undercover setting, the target of the operation
will not even know that, and in fact, deception as to that fact is essential to undercover work.
9 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47,
67 (1974).
" See infra note 180 for a discussion of confidential relationships.
95 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that evidence obtained through
a government informant and the use of a radio transmitter did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (upholding the validity of
evidence obtained through use of a paid government informant); Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952) (holding that evidence obtained by an undercover agent with a concealed
radio transmitter was valid and not obtained by trespass); see also Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
1999); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Interestingly, in United States v. Lewis,96 the case allowing undercover officers
to operate in homes, despite fraudulently gaining the homeowner's consent to enter,
the Court justified its conclusion that the officers' conduct did not violate the
homeowner's Fourth Amendment right to privacy by noting that the residence had
become a locus of commerce. In short, defendant was essentially using his
residence to conduct commercial activity.97 However, courts have not narrowly
interpreted Lewis, and the other Supreme Court cases upholding undercover
investigations, to authorize undercover entry of residences only pursuant to
investigations of commercial activity.9" Thus, courts have not suggested that law
enforcement may not use deception to enter a home when investigating merely
personal, non-commercial crimes.
Undercover techniques need not defeat location-based privacy protection if such
location-based protection prohibited government acquisition of information
regarding a place receiving heightened protection, like a residential interior, even
if acquisition of the information does not required physical intrusion. Indeed, the
Court's recent decision inKyllo v. United States9 tentatively suggests that the home
may be protected even when property rules permitting owners to deny physical
access cannot shield residential interiors. The Kyllo majority suggests that, even if
police wish to use technical devices while outside a person's property, they may not
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), provides one exception, albeit in a different
context. In Karo, police officers monitored a beeper that emitted a special electronic signal
indicating the opening of the container in which it was lodged. The container was opened
inside a residence, and the Court held that law enforcement officers could not monitor the
beeper for the special signals while the object containing the beeper remained in a residence.
Id. at 714. The police officers could establish consent, at least in a broad sense. The
defendant had voluntarily acquired the beeper-laden article, and thus a strong "assumption
of the risk" argument could be advanced. See id. at 724 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
Court rejected that approach, explaining that the beeper conveyed information about events
that took place within the protected property, i.e., the residence. Id. at 714-16 & n.4. The
Court found insignificant two facts that would normally hold great significance: first, that the
beeper was monitored from a public place - and so there was no physical breach of a
protected location by the officers, and second, that any breach resulted from the target's own
act of bringing the beeper onto his property. Id.
96 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
97 Id. at 213 ("But when, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to
which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is
entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the
street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation
to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the
occupant.").
98 Indeed, some courts suggest that Lewis holds that the homeowner loses the enhanced
privacy rights associated with residences only when he indicates a willingness to engage in
an illegal transaction. See State v. Hayes, 752 A.2d 16 (Vt. 2000).
99 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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do so if the device reveals information about the interior of the home that they could
otherwise obtain only by a physical intrusion. The Court limited its holding to
devices not generally in public use.'00
Kyllo involved police use of thermal imaging units that could identify unusual
heat sources within buildings. As currently used, such devices reveal little
information other than the homeowner's criminal activity - principally they are
used to uncover homeowners cultivation of marijuana (which may explain the
limited use of such devices by the general public that the Court found so critical). 10'
Undercover officers, and confidential informants operating under government
direction acquire a far broader range of information, information regarding far more
than illegal conduct.
Nevertheless, Kyllo will probably not lead any court to conclude that the
privacy interest in homes prohibits undercover operations that could detect matters
that could not be detected by one outside the home requires probable cause, a
warrant, or any type of individualized suspicion.0 2 Such a rule would make
'oo The Kyllo Court explained:
To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We think
that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" constitutes a search-
at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.
This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) (citation omitted).
The Court's general approach to mechanical enhancements ofunaided human senses has
been criticized as inconsistent. See David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced
Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 (1990). See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 3.2(b). The Court asserts that the test is whether the mechanical device is in common use.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986). But see CLIFFORD S.
FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 29:16, at 29-30 &
n.7 (2d ed. 1995) (observing that, under the Court's own test, Dow Chemical should have
come out the other way because satellite photograph is available to private news
organizations).
Statutes should have some effect on this determination. Some statutes prohibit the use
of devices that can be used to intrude. For example, federal law prohibits the public sale of
devices facilitating surreptitious interception ofwire, oral or electronic communications. 18
U.S.C. § 2512 (2000).
'o' See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), which approved the
practice of subjecting luggage to drug-sniffing dogs because the dogs revealed only the
presence of contraband. Thus such dog sniffs focused only on illegal activity. They were
not over-inclusive - i.e., they did not tell law enforcement officials about legal property the
bag's owner possessed.
02 United States v. Davis, - F.3d -, 2003 WL 1908025 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003)
(dismissing argument that undercover use ofvideo recording equipment while in defendant's
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undercover work in the decidedly blue-collar area of drug enforcement impractical:
Agents might have to avoid entering homes until they could get a warrant, and as
a result, deprive agents of the flexibility needed for undercover operations.'0 3
In short, in the criminal, regulatory and civil context, location has played a
central role in protecting privacy both by giving individuals a physical area from
which they can exclude the curious and by defining privacy in terms of the location
in which an activity takes place. This location-based approach has not adequately
protected privacy, and absent a drastic change of judicial approach, undercover
operations will continue to undermine such location-based protections.
B. The Means of Communication as a Mode of Privacy
Society might choose to protect privacy by protecting all, or at least some,
means of communication from unwanted breach rather than by protecting certain
physical locations. Thus, for example, rather than protecting the place in which
speakers engage in communication, protection would focus on shielding the
communication itself, rendering the speakers' or potential intruder's location
irrelevant.'0 4
The question of whether wiretapping constitutes an invasion of privacy
exemplifies the radical divergence between location-focused and means-of-
communications-focused definitions of privacy - and the court's location-focused
analysis lies at the root of its historically inadequate analysis of wiretapping. If
home to consummate a drug transaction made unconstitutional by Kyllo).
'03 See Philip B. Heymann, Understanding Criminal Investigations, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs.
315, 331-34 (1985); see also FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 83-84, 106 (1981) (testimony of Associate Attorney General Paul R. Michel)
(explaining that requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion before an undercover
officer offers a person an opportunity to commit a crime is unworkable because undercover
investigations "are inherently and unavoidably evolutionary in nature"); MARX, supra note
8, at 195; Bell, supra note 11, at 799 n.235 ("Establishing standards for undercover operators
is particularly troublesome, in part due to the fluidity of many undercover situations. Even
police officials supervising undercover operations have trouble drawing lines and providing
firm instructions given the necessary fluidity of the situation"); Katherine Goldwasser, After
ABSCAM: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in
Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 128-29 (1987).
'0' Location-based privacy rules can partially protect the means of communication,
particularly if the communication involves face-to-face contact. However, technological
advances even erode location-based protections of face-to-face communications. More
significantly, much of modern communication does not take place in person, but rather by
means of communication that rely upon channels open to the general public. Most mail goes
through a federal instrumentality itself. Telephonic and electronic communications are
transmitted by common carriers.
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analyzed employing a location-focused perspective, wiretapping may not constitut6
a "search or seizure" if the wiretapper merely reaches the telephone company's
property.' More specifically, had the Court employed its traditional location-
focused analysis, in Katz v. United States, it would have rejected Katz's Fourth
Amendment claim" 6 because a telephone booth from which Katz placed his call
was not a protected place under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis: a law
enforcement officer, or anyone else, could view Katz through the glass of the phone
booth.0 7 Indeed, until Katz the Court had focused on constitutionally protected
areas. '08 But the breakthrough that made Katz a seminal case was the Court's focus
on the means of communication - in particular, whether telephone
communications deserved protection, rather than on the location of the participant
in the phone conversation.0 9 Though the phone booth Katz had used was not itself
a constitutionally protected place, Katz could assert a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the contents of his conversation because the conversation had taken place
over the telephone."0
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Thus, for example, the government
does not breach any reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus does not conduct a search
or seizure, if it convinces the telephone company to install a pen register on a subscriber's
line. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
"06 Indeed, the question presented as the petitioner formulated it was "whether a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area... ?" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 349 (1967). Interestingly, the second question focused on whether the existence of a
trespass was of critical Fourth Amendment importance.
07 A court could designate telephone booths as protected places because of the nature of
the activity that customarily occurs therein- namely personal telephone conversations that
the speaker expects to remain private. Thus, a nonconventional property-focused analysis
might have accorded Katz an expectation of privacy by precluding law enforcement officials
from penetrating that booth, either physically or by electronic means, without satisfying the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements.
108 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3.2(a), at 133; RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L.
ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 92 (1999).
'09 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 ("To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.").
1o The Supreme Court had long before taken an analogous approach to the mails. See Ex
Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (holding unconstitutional postal officials' opening and
reading of sealed letters); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (distinguishing sealed letters
from telephone conversations). The constitutional protection has been supplemented by
administrative regulations limiting the use of "mail covers." In a "mail cover," postal
employees record the information on the outside of envelopes mailed by a particular patron.
Law enforcement officers cannot obtain authorization for a mail cover unless they establish
reason to believe that the mail cover will provide evidence of a serious crime or lead to the
apprehension of a fugitive. See 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (2002); see also JAMES RULE Er AL., THE
POLITICS OF PRIVACY: PLANNING FOR PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS AS POWERFUL
TECHNOLOGIES 55 (1980).
The law regarding mail covers provides an example of situations in which nonjudicial
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No means of communication can be absolutely immune from breach. Such
absolute immunity would create a means for conspirators to plot and carry out
crimes free from government scrutiny. Some advocates of encryption have argued
that Internet communications should essentially be absolutely immune from
breach."' By contrast, law enforcement agencies seek built-in "back doors"
permitting decryption of encrypted messages. Such back doors would allow law
enforcement access to the encrypted messages upon a showing of probable cause. "2
Wiretap laws were crafted to protect privacy by safeguarding the means many
entities are more privacy-protective than courts. Courts have not restricted mail covers.
Lower courts have rarely perceived that any interest protected by the fourth
amendment is implicated by mail covers. In part, this is due to recurring attacks
of Olmsteadism: no trespass is involved, no search or seizure occurs when the
eye registers the impressions from the outside of an envelope or the hand records
the information.... Equally rare is recognition that "the mails [are] almost as
much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues ......
Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searchesfor Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental
Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1510-11 (1979) (quoting United States ex
rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921))
(citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Sandy D. Hellums, Note, Bits and Bytes:
The Carnivore Initiative and the Search and Seizure of Electronic Mail, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 827, 837-39 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's upholding of mail covers
as constitutional in United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1983)); Invasion of Privacy:
Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 165 (1968).
.. Often, technological advances tend to reduce privacy. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27.(2001); TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 203 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998).
But encryption is a privacy-enhancing technological advance. See MARX, supra note 8, at
217-19.
12 [K]ey recovery is basically an updated tap. To argue that the government is
permitted to tape regular phone calls, even if the callers are using some kind of
coded language .... but not to eavesdrop on encrypted messages is no more
logical than to suggest that the government may search and seize old-fashioned
paper files (if granted a warrant) but not computerized ones.
AMITAI ETZIONE, THE LiMITS OF PRIVACY 91-92 (1999); see also A. Michael Froomkin,
Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm ? The Death ofPrivacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1484, 1487 (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor.is the Key: Cryptography,
the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PENN. L. REV .709(1995); Eben Moglen, So
Much for Savages: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of Play, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 51 (1999); Maricela Segura, Is Carnivore Devouring Your Privacy, 75 S. CAL
L. REV. 231 (2002); Question andAnswer Session Following Panel 1, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 21 (1999) (statement of Professor Ronald K. Noble, New York University
School of Law):
What is the problem if law enforcement is only seeking the same kinds of
opportunities that they have currently - that is, they do not want the law to give
them any more rights than they currently have, they just do not want technology
to defeat what the law permits - what is wrong with that?
[Vol. 11:151
THEATRICAL INVESTIGATION
people use to communicate personal information - namely telephones and other
electronic devices.'13 As the Supreme Court recently explained:
Over 30 years ago, with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Congress recognized that the "[t]remendous
scientific and technological developments that have taken place in the
last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of
electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments,
privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques
of surveillance .... No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to
retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken word relating to
each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial
concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the
speaker to the auditor's advantage.' 14
The wiretap laws generally prohibit third parties from intercepting
communications. They permit police interception of communications, but only after
the police satisfy requirements more demanding than those applicable to
intrusions.." 5 By conferring such protection, Congress sought to restore citizens'
confidence in telephonic (and other) communications by reestablishing the integrity
of communications over telecommunications devices." 6
Wiretap laws have generally proven effective in preventing nongovernmental
third parties from intercepting covered communications. "7 However, the Supreme
"' The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, the successor to Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, categorizes communications as oral,
wire, and electronic. Oral communications are defined as "oral communication uttered by
a person" and generally involve people within speaking distance communicating without the
use of a telephone or other communications equipment. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000). Wire
communications are defined as "aural transfer[s] made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for transmission . . . by . . . wire, cable, or other like connection," i.e.,
communications using telephone lines and the equivalent. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). Electronic
communications are defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, data, writings, images, sound
data or intelligence" transmitted in whole or in part by "wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photooptical system" that falls outside the definitions of oral or wire
communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). For example, faxes and e-mails would be
categorized as electronic communications. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, at
269-72; FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 100, §§ 2:8-:13, 2:14-:27, 3:2.
" Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542-43 (2001) (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154).
"' See generally FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 100.
..6 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 523, 526; id. at 541-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
". ECPA allows some private third-party interception of covered communications.
Employers may sometimes monitor employees' communications, and some members of a
household may monitor the communications of co-habitants. ECPA allows employers to
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Court's recent decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper"8 introduces a subject matter test
into the wiretap law provisions regarding dissemination of illegally-wiretapped
conversations. '9 In Bartnicki, a disc jockey played over the air a tape recording of
a cell phone conversation between two union leaders. The unknown person who
had illegally recorded the call had delivered a copy of the tape to the disc jockey. ,20
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") prohibits anyone from
divulging a conversation if he or she has reason to believe that the conversation was
intercepted in violation of ECPA, regardless of whether or not such person
participated in the illegal interception. The Court held that the First Amendment
precluded punishing a person not implicated in the illegal interception from
divulging the contents of illegally wiretapped conversations that involved matters
of public importance.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion is the Court's
comment that the discjockey could publish the information derived from the illegal
interception of a wire communication because the statements made in the course of
the private call would have been newsworthy had they been made in a public
setting. 2' In effect, the majority treated the means of communication, namely a
private phone conversation rather than a" public statement, as irrelevant to the
speakers' legitimate expectations of privacy. The Court did so even though the
wiretap laws it was addressing specifically focused privacy protection on the means
of communication (not subject matter considerations).
In criminal cases, courts have split on whether law enforcement can use the
monitor employee conversations by using commercially available telephone equipment in the
ordinary course of the employer's business. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4), 2510(5)(a)(I); see also
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 100, §§ 7:3-:11. Citing the Omnibus Crime Control
Act's legislative history, some courts have engrafted a "marital home" exception upon the
statutory text that allows some members of a household to surreptitiously listen in on the
conversations of others. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974);
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 100, §§ 7:12-:18.
118 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
".. Id. at 534-35. Journalists who have no role in the illegal interception of oral,
electronic, or wire communication cannot be liable for disclosing information obtained from
the illegal interception, even if they had reason to know the interception was illegal, if the
subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern.
120 The illegally intercepted conversation between a local union head and the union's chief
negotiator concerned contract negotiation with the local school board. During the call, the
union president asserted that if the school board did not meet the union's demands (or at least
show more flexibility), "we're gonna have to go to their, their homes .... To blow off their
front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys." Id. at 518-19 (omission
in original). There is no indication that any action was taken consistent with those assertions.
12' Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 ("If the statements about the labor negotiations had been
made in a public arena - during a bargaining session, for example - they would have been
newsworthy. That would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki
making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone.").
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contents of communications illegally intercepted by others.'22 Bartnicki will
strengthen the argument for police use of illegally wiretapped conversations.
Indeed, Bartnicki itself, albeit in a different context, declares criminal activity itself
a matter of public interest.
Some means of communication are particularly disfavored, in large part due to
anomalies in constitutional doctrine. Writings, for instance, leave a physical
presence which makes them subject to subpoenas calling for their production. The
similarity between writing and testimony was a foundation of the Court's now
defunct opinion in Boyd v. United States,'23 In Boyd the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment precluded subpoenas compelling production of incriminating written
records, '24 equating compelled production of incriminating writings with compelled
production of testimony. 1
25
But consent also defeats means-of-communication privacy protections, at least
when it is law enforcement agents or their collaborators who obtain the consent.' 26
The power of private undercover investigators to rely on fraudulently obtained
consent as a defense against privacy claims is unclear.'27
22 Matt Greenberg, Law Enforcement Officer With Clean Hands May Not Make
Investigative Use of Wiretap That Was Illegally Acquired by a Third Party: Berry v. Funk,
146 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 463 (2000); see also United States v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
123 116 U.S. 616,637 (1886).
124 Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1041-42; see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (holding that "any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime" is barred by the Fifth Amendment).
25 The current distinction between compelled production of documents and compelled
testimony could, alternatively, reflect an analysis focused on the means of intrusion. Perhaps
subpoenas cause less alarm than searches because subpoenas have a passive quality. The
citizens whose papers are subpoenaed identify the relevant papers and produce them.
Contrastingly, during searches, law enforcement officers peruse large amounts of material,
much of which may be irrelevant, to identify the material relevant to the investigation. See
Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1946); PIERCE ET AL., supra note
19, § 8.2, at 408-09 (3d ed. 1999).
126 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
127 In the civil context, means-of-communications protection can also be subverted by
property rights. For example, the owner of an e-mail network, who may be a large employer,
has a right to monitor messages transmitted over its system. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2000); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (providing ordinary business exception to wiretap laws); Epps v.
St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 416-17 (11 th Cir. 1986); James v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 108, at 267; cf Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153,
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Dealing with undercover techniques and deceptive acquisition of consent by
distinguishing among means of communication has little merit. No particular means
of communication seems more intimate than others. At least there is too little
difference to make worthwhile differentiating the methods of regulation based on
the means of communication involved.1
28
In short, laws sometimes protect privacy by ensuring that communications can
remain confidential.
C. The Means of Intrusion as a Mode of Privacy
Occasionally, privacy protection is focused on controlling particular means of
intrusion. For example, electronic recording has received special attention.'29 In
civil, and sometimes even criminal, contexts, courts consider recording a
conversation more problematic than repeating it. Take the case of Dietemann v.
1157 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that consent maybe implied); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d
346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that private telephone conversations are held to a higher
level of scrutiny).
Elements of location and interpersonal relationships also have a factor in considering the
sanctity of telephone communication, thus courts have created a domestic exception to the
wiretap laws. TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 108, at 280-87.
12 Means can also be certain types of items. For instance, items particularly affiliated
with internal thought might enjoy heightened protection. Indeed, this seems to have been a
major concern expressed by Warren and Brandeis in their seminal article. Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) ("The common law
secures to each individual the right of determining ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others"); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The makers of our Constitution... recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations.
For example, diaries may receive greater protection than other documentary records. See
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he
documents at stake here are business records which implicate a lesser degree of concern for
privacy interests than, for example, personal diaries."); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
350 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Diaries and personal letters that record only their
author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy."). Public library records,
which record the materials one reads by recording the material checked out might also be
given heightened protection. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 11-25 (West 1986); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:73-43.2 (West 1989); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4509 (McKinney 1989); see also Ulrika
Ault, The FBI's LibraryAwareness Program: Is Big BrotherReading Over Your Shoulder?,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532 (1990).
129 See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 1208-18.
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Time, Inc., '3 in which a homeowner who offered clay, mineral and herbal remedies
for various medical conditions sued journalists who entered his home under false
pretenses, allegedly seeking treatment. During their visit the journalists had used
hidden audio and video recording equipment to document their interaction with
Dietemann. The Court found that the journalists had wrongfully invaded
Dieteman's privacy, but not because the reporters' had been unfaithful confidants
(i.e., false friends), who had willingly disclosed the observations he made while in
Dietemann's home under false pretenses. Members of society must accept such a
risk. But the court distinguished the risk of being electronically recorded within
one's home from the risk posed by tattling "false friends," and concluded that
members of society should not have to assume such a risk.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court, in applying the Fourth
Amendment to criminal investigations, has equated electronically recorded
undercover conversations with investigative targets and undercover efforts lacking
such electronic monitoring. Some state supreme courts have adopted a contrary
view, holding that even law enforcement undercover operations using electronic
monitoring must be treated more seriously than those that do not.' 
31
At first glance, as the Supreme Court suggested in United States v. Lopez and
United States v. White, 31 prohibiting electronic recording merely enables speakers
to "plausibly deny" statements that they did indeed make. 3 3 As the Lopez majority
opined:
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to saying that
he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent's
memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by
corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no
other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a
conversation that the agent could testify to from memory.
34
A plea for legal protection to facilitate dissimulation is difficult to justify, especially
in the context of criminal or regulatory investigations. But perhaps alternative
explanations justify treating recordings and replaying conversations differently from
repeating conversations without using recording equipment. Use of recording
130 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
'3' State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978); State v. Hayes, 752 A.2d 16 (Vt.
2000); State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 556 (Vt. 1991).
132 White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
133 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963); see also White, 401 U.S. at 753
("[W]e are not prepared to hold that a defendant who has no constitutional right to exclude
the informer's unaided testimony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege against a
more accurate version of the events in question.").
13' Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.
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equipment may cause heightened concern because recordings capture details of a
speaker's facial expressions or intonation which renditions of conversations from
memory do not. However, such an explanation warrants some skepticism. Some
who possess both an excellent memory and a facility for imitation can surely report
a conversation by mimicking the original speaker, yet surely their doing so would
not be considered especially problematic.
A sound, but not especially rigorous explanation for the greater seriousness with
which we treat recording conversations might be grounded in the intuition that the
impermanent differs from the permanent. ' Before going on the record (i.e., setting
forth thoughts in permanent form), people should know they are on the record and
have an opportunity to craft their words precisely. Such a principle restores a rough
equality between speakers and recipients - speakers will have an opportunity to
put substantial effort into crafting their speech, just as recipients will have an
opportunity to devote substantial attention to analyzing it.
Ultimately, however, this interest, while substantial, might not outweigh
society's interest in the prosecution of crime or the effective regulation of conduct
legitimately subject to government constraint. The interest in allowing speakers to
craft their words precisely before those words take permanent form may, however,
outweigh the interests furthered by allowing private citizens to surreptitiously
record conversations in which they participate. Such interests include ensuring that
the populace learns information of public importance necessary to exercise the right
of self-government and ensuring that individuals have the information they need to
exercise autonomy. 6 Because First Amendment doctrine distinguishes speech
from conduct, making conduct subject to greater regulation, 7 legislators can
impose criminal and civil liability upon electronic recording of conversations even
if the act of recording is performed to obtain information of genuine public
concern.
38
"I White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Authority is hardly required to support
the proposition that words would be measured a good deal more carefully and
communication inhibited if one suspected that his conversation were being transmitted and
transcribed."). Justice Harlan observed:
Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on the obscurity
of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited audience, and the
likelihood that the listener will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as
the listener's inability to reformulate a conversation without having to contend
with a documented record. All these values are sacrificed by a rule of law that
permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only by the need to
locate a willing assistant.
Id. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
'3 Bell, supra note 11, at 778 n.146.
'" Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,253 (2002); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
38 Computerization is also especially problematic. Computerization of records removes
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Indeed, an appreciation that the means of intrusion can raise special privacy
concerns might address some of the criticisms leveled against the Court's location-
focused Fourth Amendment doctrine. Invasion of privacy may, ultimately, often
merely consist of focusing undue attention upon others, as Professor Jeffrey Rosen
has recently suggested.'39 As Fourth Amendment law has developed, law
enforcement officers can focus on individuals in "public" spaces for as long, and
in as much detail, as they desire. The courts could embrace a slightly different
Fourth Amendment approach. They could continue to rule that law enforcement
officials need not avert their eyes from matters they and members of the public
would naturally observe momentarily as they go about their business. However,
government officials must satisfy the warrant and probable cause requirements (or
identify appropriate exception) before focusing unusual attention upon such matters.
Differences in the degree of attention directed at people or property in public spaces
(or observable from public spaces) do not alter a location-based analysis, but may
well alter an analysis focused on the means of intruding upon others. The
difference in the amount of attention given from a public place is not a location-
based difference, but a difference in the means of intrusion.
Under the foregoing analysis, Fourth Amendment cases involving aerial
surveillance might be resolved differently. The Court has held that because aircraft
operate in public space - namely the airways controlled by the Federa Aviation
Administration (the "FAA") - and because any passenger may freely look into an
enclosed backyard as he travels past it, law enforcement officers may photograph
enclosed backyards (using detail-enlarging enhancements if necessary) or hover
the "practical obscurity," U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989), ofrecords that are "available" but difficult to acquire and compile.
Thus, Congress has imposed special restrictions on federal agencies' use of computer
matching. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)
(2000). Similarly the federal and state courts have begun to address concerns about
computerization of court records. Such computerization surely has more serious privacy
implications than mere maintenance of the court records themselves. Kate Marquess, Open
Court?: As Courthouses Rush to Put Filing Online, Easy Access to Legal Documents Has
Many Worrying About Privacy Rights, A.B.A.J., Apr. 2002, at 54; see also JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT. REPORT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
Policy.htm; MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS
& JUSTICE MGMT. INST., DEVELOPING CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO
COURT RECORDS: A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS (2002), available at
http://www.courtaccess.org/modelpolicy/180ct2002FinalReport.pdf. In the nongovernmental
realm, Amatai Etzione has discussed the implications ofcomputerization ofmedical records
for medical privacy. ETZIONE, supra note 112, at 142-43.
' JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
16-18 (2001) (discussing "civil inattention" - an expectation of a zone of privacy among
strangers).
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over such yards for extended periods, examining their contents or any activities
occurring therein. 4' By focusing on the nature of the intrusion, and in particular the
offense to privacy that occurs when strangers pay undue attention to each other, we
might distinguish the conduct of an airplane passenger or law enforcement officer
who happens to observe incriminating activity as she goes about her business and
the law enforcement officer, journalist, or private citizen who hovers over the same
yard and concentrates on the activity occurring in that yard.
Undercover activity itself could be subjected to regulation as a particularly
problematic means of intruding into privacy. Government use of deception is
inherently problematic."' Moreover, such deception can produce several related
problems. Undercover operations may lead investigatory targets to commit criminal
acts they would otherwise never have committed, due to the lack of opportunity.'42
Public knowledge of deceptive tactics may also enable some miscreants to engage
in criminal acts by posing as undercover law enforcement officers. "3 And indeed,
some confidential informants used by law enforcement in undercover settings
engage in independent crimes for their own benefit while acting as confidential
informants. For example, Mark A. Whiteacre, an Archer Daniels Midland Co.
executive, embezzled millions of dollars while operating as a confidential informant
assisting the FBI's investigation of the company for antitrust violations."' Even
non-targets whom the government must deceive in the course of an undercover
investigation may suffer loss. For instance, the Fifth Circuit recently considered a
damages action brought by an executive whose career had suffered when he left a
legitimate business to join a business established by the FBI as a part of a "sting"
"' See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,215 n.3 (1986); FISHMAN &MCKENNA, supra
note 100, § 29:16.
14" See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
174-191(1978).
142 This problem is addressed by the entrapment defense, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 435-36;
LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 20, §§ 5.1-5.2; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 39, § 5.2; MARX,
supra note 8, at 188-90, although even the entrapment defense deals only with the lack of
desire to commit the crime rather than the lack of resources to commit it, though courts
sometimes disagree about how to deal with situations in which law enforcement officials
provide essential help to commit the crime. See generally PAULMARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE (2d ed. 1995).
"'3 MARX, supra note 8, at 146, 176.
14" United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 654-55 (2000); see also MARX, supra note
8, at 144-45; Amanda J. Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI's
Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301
(2001). The FBI has recently adopted new guidelines on the handling of confidential
informants. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF





Not only is government deception inherently problematic, but undercover
investigations often take on the quality of a "general search,"' 46 i.e., an unfocused
search to uncover possible criminality not directed toward discovering any
particular item or person. The Framers of the Bill of Rights considered general
searches particularly abhorrent.' 47  Undercover techniques allow agents and
confidential informants to gather large amounts of information about the
investigative target and his activities, much of which has no relevance to the crime
agents suspect the target of committing. Indeed, such techniques allow law
enforcement to simply test the integrity of the target without having any reason to
suspect the individual of wrongdoing.
However, courts have justifiably exhibited a reluctance to place limits on
undercover work as a mode of investigation. Such investigations have proven
essential and effective in a variety of circumstances, as the Supreme Court has
noted. 41 Moreover, undercover operations are not an inherent affront to privacy.
For example, posing as a customer or as a potential home buyer should not be
considered an invasion of the retailer's or realtor's privacy (even though such
conduct is deceptive). Nor do undercover operations inherently possess the quality
of a general search.
Some undercover operations are quite narrowly focused, and the targets largely
select themselves. For example, government-operated fake fencing operations or
decoy prostitutes will probably ensnare only those interested in engaging in illegal
conduct, and will largely uncover information relevant to potential criminal
prosecution. 41
In short, a focus on the means of intrusion can sometimes produce a more subtle
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1999).
' E.g., Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: a Reconsideration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 578-85 (1996); Slobogin, surpa note 94, at 807.
117 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,583 n.21 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning 1494-1508 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School) (on file with the University of Michigan Dissertation Information Service).
141 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435-36 (1973) (asserting that sometimes
"deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available"); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) ("'Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time
immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime consists of preparing
for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely upon them or upon accomplices because the
criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly."') (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950) (Learned Hand, J.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)); Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42
(1932); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156
U.S. 604, 610 (1895).
149 MARX, supra note 8, at 71-72.
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and realistic analysis of privacy issues than that derived from either the location-
based or means-of-communication-based perspectives outlined previously.
D. Subject Matter as a Mode of Privacy
Sometimes the protection offered by privacy law depends on the subject matter
at issue. Some information may qualify as private, and thus may not be subject to
public discussion absent the consent of the person to whom the information
pertains. Such a subject matter approach could take precedence over a competing
approach, such as the traditional location-focused mode of analysis. In a media
case, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,'° the Alabama Supreme Court considered
whether to hold a photojournalist liable for publishing his photograph of a woman
whose dress had been blown upward unexpectedly by an air vent, revealing her
undergarments. The woman brought a cause of action for publication of private
facts.
At the time the picture was taken, both the woman and the photographer were
in a public place - a county fair. A location-based analysis would have suggested
that the Daily Times Democrat could publish the picture. Instead, the Court focused
on the subject matter of the picture, which it characterized as involving indecent
exposure. The Court thus held wrongful the taking and distribution of photographs
showing a person's underwear in circumstances where the subject neither
intentionally exposed her underwear nor consented to the publication of the
photograph.' 5 ' Note, however, that the Court could have reached the opposite result
using a subject-matter-based analysis, the photograph captures an unusual event that
might remind readers of a popular image of then-widely acclaimed movie star
Marilyn Monroe.'52
A subject-matter approach could encompass the acquisition of information, as
well as public discussion of information.'53 Thus, it is inappropriate to ask strangers
'5 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
'5' The Court could have focused on the means of intrusion. It might have found tortious
either intentionally photographing a person in such a predicament or showing such a picture
to others, but allowed an observer to describe the event. The permanence of the photograph
could have been identified as the core privacy problem. Such an approach would have
protected Graham, the subject of the photograph, had the photographer merely retained the
photograph and shown it to a few friends rather than publishing the photograph in a
newspaper.
152 THE SEVEN YEAR ITCH (20th Century Fox 1955) (scene in which Marilyn Monroe's
dress blown upward as she stood over an air vent).
'5 The constitutional law doctrine permitting welfare inspections of recipients' homes
without individualized suspicion or a warrant may be illustrative. In that context, which
involves information acquisition, a subject-matter analysis trumps a location-based analysis.
In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Supreme Court confronted a Fourth
Amendment challenge to social service agency caseworkers' inspections of recipients homes
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about their salary, the amount of money in their bank account, or the type of
undergarments they wear. The notoriety of the "boxers or brief' question asked of
President Clinton during a 1994 appearance on MTV illustrates the point.'54
Of course, with regard to the acquisition of information, society need only
address coercive requests for information (such as "no information, no job" or "no
information, no credit").' 5 Not only can individuals otherwise control their own
disclosure of personal information (assuming they have dominion over some
physical location that affords privacy and can control the repetition of the
information they entrust to others), the ability to selectively provide such
information is a necessary element of intimacy. 6 We may define our circle of
friends by our willingness to share private information about ourselves with them.
Thus, the subject matter mode most often addresses dissemination of information,
pursuant to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program. Though the
home, as a location, receives paramount privacy protection, and citizens generally have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their dwellings, the Court found that state officials, in
making home inspections, had breached no expectation of privacy of the aid recipients.
Thus, such home inspections without individualized suspicion and a warrant did not
contravene the Fourth Amendment.
One can explain the Court's rejection of the location-based analysis by viewing the case
as turning on consent. The recipient had the right to exclude caseworkers, which she waived
by seeking to participate in the AFDC program. Id. at 317-18,321-22. However, one might
also view the case as holding that conditions in the recipient's home became a matter of
public concern once she began receiving aid under the AFDC program. Id. at 318-19. This
subject-matter aspect of the Court's analysis suggests that aid recipients have no right of
privacy in the condition of their homes given the relevance of those conditions to both their
continued eligibility for the AFDC program and an assessment of the aid's efficacy.
The Wyman Court also relied, in part, on a means of intrusion approach to uphold the
home inspections. Id. at 320-21 ("The means employed by [the state agency] are
significant."). The Court noted that authorities engaged in no snooping, provided the
recipient advanced written notice of the inspection, and used no deception in conducting the
home inspection - in short, the means of intrusion were "gentle." Id. at 319-21. Analysis
of privacy expectations based on the subject matter and means of intrusion were simply
considered as more relevant than the location of the intrusion, the aspect of the case the
dissenters emphasized. Id. at 327-38, 332-33, 334-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at
338-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"54 See, e.g., Brian Balogh, An Evolving Presidency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, at M ;
Howard Witt, Powell on MTV Show, Urges Condom Use to Prevent AIDS, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
15, 2002. For an account of Clinton's MTV appearance, see Clinton Gives Revealing
Answers to MTV Crowd, CHi. TRiB., Apr. 26, 1994, at 3.
... See infra note 172 (concerning requests for HIV status or genetic information for
purposes of insurance).
156 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,484 (1968) (noting that love and friendship
require different levels of disclosure; without the ability to differentiate the level of disclosure
of facts about oneself, there can be no love or respect); see also Bell, supra note 11, at 770
& n. 109.
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rather than access.
The subject matter mode of privacy has some relevance to criminal
investigation because some subject matter constraints are imposed on
investigations. However, subject matter limitations serve as only the most mild
constraint on criminal investigations. As we shall see, the constraints are largely
those of relevance. Given the growing scope of criminal liability, a relevancy
standard offers little privacy protection.'57
The subject matter constraints on criminal investigation relate largely to
relevance and law enforcement purpose. Thus, subpoenas may only request
materials relevant to the criminal investigation.' Courts do, however, view
relevance broadly, and thus government investigators can generally satisfy the
relevance standard quite easily."' Searches and seizures must serve a law
enforcement purpose. 6 Police officers have been found to unlawfully invade a
crime victim's privacy by photographing her nude body even though the
photographs could not further their efforts to apprehend the perpetrator. 6 ' Law
enforcement officers have also been found potentially liable for allowingjoumalists
' Some scholars have noted that the expansion of criminal liability makes more
information relevant to criminal investigations. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative
Dimension ofFourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642,1651 (1998)
(observing that the pervasiveness of traffic regulation gives police officers the discretion to
stop virtually any car, for some traffic infraction, to investigate suspicions that the driver is
involved in some criminal activity); William J. Stuntz, O.J Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REv. 842, 864 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Transubstantive Fourth Amendment]; Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1026; cf RoSEN,supra
note 139, at 79, 81, 84, 87-88 (suggesting that the expansion of conduct constituting
employment discrimination has led to a reduction in employees' privacy). William Stuntz
suggests that the politics of criminal law create systemic pressure to increase the number of
crimes (though perhaps the pressure merely encourages an expansion of the number of ways
particular conduct can be characterized as criminal). William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). At the same time, the Supreme
Court has rarely subjected the substantive scope of criminal liability to judicial review. See
Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why is this Right Different from All Other
Rights, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 790-:-94 (1994).
' United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) ("Where ... a subpoena is
challenged on relevancy grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court
determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the
Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject ofthe grand jury's
investigation."); Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) ("The
requirement of 'probable cause,. . .' applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that
of an order for production by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized
by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to
the inquiry.").
... PIERCE ET AL., supra note 19, at 412 n.44.
60 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999).
161 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
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to accompany them on searches of private residences.162 In each case, the court held
that the police actions constituted a wrongful invasion of plaintiff's privacy because
the challenged act lacked a law enforcement purpose.1
63
Howeverjudicial acceptance of government intrusion in the course of acquiring
information may be premised, in part, on government officials' limited interest in
broad dissemination of much of the "private" information it obtains.1 64 There are
relatively few formal limits on the dissemination of information by law enforcement
or regulators. 165 Law enforcement dissemination of information is often relatively
constrained. Generally, law enforcement officials do not divulge information
except to prosecute an individual or to alert the public to some illegal act or course
of conduct. Administrative agencies, publicize a wider range of information - they
certainly do not limit themselves to information related to criminal prosecutions. 166
162 Wilson v. Layne, 525 U.S. 603 (1999).
163 Id. at 609, 611; York, 324 F.2d at 455; see also Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding staged "perp walk" unconstitutional in certain circumstances because
it serves no law enforcement purpose).
" See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that dissemination of
information on patients prescribed certain drugs was not an invasion of privacy);
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 108, at 67-68 (arguing that dissemination among state
employees is not important); see also Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989); ROSEN, supra note 139, at 42; TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 108,
at 177. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991); Stuntz, supra
note 7.
165 Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51-53, 63-92 (1995) (suggesting that Fourth Amendment
reasonableness extends to law enforcement publication of information).
One notable restraint on law enforcement officials is grand jury secrecy. See FED. R.
CRiM. P. 6(e)(2); LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 20, § 8.3(f),§ 8.5 ("[P]ublic disclosure of the
investigation may cause irreparable harm to his reputation even though the investigation
eventually reveals no basis for prosecution."); Stuntz, Transubstantive Fourth Amendment,
supra note 157, at 857 (criticizing Special Prosecutor Kenneth W. Starr's handling of grand
jury material during his investigation of President Clinton).
There is no constitutional limitation on the dissemination ofeven false information. Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Moreover, once the government releases of information,
even by mistake, citizens have a constitutional right to further disseminate that information,
regardless of the subject's privacy interest in that information. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 536-41 (1989). Indeed, further dissemination of information obtained from the
government is protected, even when it harms the victim of a crime, as long as the information
was legally acquired. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979).
However, the government can and sometimes does impose liability on itself for such breaches
of privacy.
166 Doe v. City ofNew York, 15 F.3d 264,269 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing agency's need
to disseminate information about litigation successes, but balancing with privacy is required);
JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DisCLosuRE § 25.01 (2d ed. 1999); ELLEN
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However, even their release of information is largely related to their defined public
mission.
In the private realm, both the practicalities and the law differ. The media's
primary mission is information dissemination, 67 and media entities will not limit
disclosure of criminal activity or regulatory violations simply because they will not
lead to criminal prosecution or administrative actions. 168 Tort law recognizes a
cause of action for publication of private facts. That cause of action and the
location-focused intrusion into seclusion cause of action discussed previously
largely provide the common-law redress for beach of informational privacy. (Other
privacy torts, such as false light privacy (focusing on falsity) and appropriation of
likeness (focusing commercial use of citizens' faces, bodies, and names) do not
really address informational privacy.) The publication of private facts action,
whose developments owes more to Warren and Brandeis' pathbreaking Harvard
Law Review article, advocating common law protection of privacy, 169 than does any
of the other common law privacy actions, defines privacy rights in terms of subject
matter. Publication of certain facts about a person constitutes an invasion of her
privacy because of the subject matter involved. Plaintiff can prevail on the claim
only if the defendant publicizes a private matter in which the public has no
legitimate interest. The means of acquiring the information is immaterial, making
the physical location, means of communication, and means of intrusion modes of
privacy analysis largely irrelevant.
The ineffectiveness of the publication of private facts action as a privacy
protection illustrates the difficulty of using the subject-matter mode of analysis to
protect privacy. Plaintiffs can rarely successfully pursue a publication of private
facts claim, because they can rarely prove that the published information reveals
nothing of legitimate public concern. Indeed, virtually any information, even that
we ordinarily consider personal, can be viewed as a matter of public concern. '70
Much activity is regulated by the government in some manner and, therefore,
ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 144 (1995) (discussing Doe v.
Borough offBarrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990)); Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity
by AdministrativeAgencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1382-1419 (1973) (discussing agency
use of publicity); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm- Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 873, 887-91; Ralph Vartabedian & Edwin
Chen, FAA to Provide Safety Reports on the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at Al.
67 Bell, supra note 11, at 785 n. 178.
168 A recent example is the playing of an undercover tape capturing Al Sharpton's reaction
to a proposal that he participate in a cocaine transaction. The relevant law enforcement
agency did not publicly disseminate the tape presumably because it did not show activity
warranting prosecution. HBO played the tape as a part of a documentary about the figure
who sought to involve Sharpton in the narcotics deal. See Glenn Thrush, Sharpton Files $1
Billion Suit Over HBO Drug Tape, CHi. SuN-TIMES, July 25, 2002, at 18.
69 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 128, at 196.
70 See generally ROSEN, supra note 139, at 48-50; Zimmerman, supra note 30.
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is of public concern if there is a potential crime or regulatory violation. Even
currently unregulated activity can be subject to regulation. Thus even such activity
may qualify as a matter of public concern, so that the public can obtain the
information to consider whether the current regulatory regime needs expansion,
contraction, or some other change. Public servants' participation in government
makes many aspects of their lives matters of public concern.
Moreover, though the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause serves to further
self-government, the legitimate interests of the public encompass more than
governmental affairs. Many "public figures" who play no role in government, such
as corporate executives, may more profoundly affects many people's lives than
government officials do.' Surely facts about society in general and societal
transformations are matters of public interest, as are the ordeals that individuals
must face, particularly when many members of society will have to confront similar
ordeals. For example, the ways in which individuals cope with the HIV infection
or AIDS, including decisions they make with regard to treatment and lifestyle, have
significance for the substantial number of people who must face those same
challenges and who might find comfort in knowing that they are not alone.'72
As the foregoing suggests, some very personal matters may become matters of
public importance because they illustrate some broader trend. For example, in
Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf Inc.,1  very personal information regarding the
relationship between two ordinary people, Ruby Lee Daniels and Luther Haynes,
was found a matter of public interest, precluding Haynes from prevailing on his
171 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring); see also SISSELA BoK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND
REVELATION 257 (1982) ("[Ift has become increasingly hard to draw a clear line between
government information and information about the private sector."). The recent dramatic
loss in value of Enron and WorldCom stock, which jeopardized many individual retirement
plans, e.g., SEN. RPT. No. 107-222, at 4-6 (2002) (describing the Enron scandal); Jerry
Knight, WorldCom Woes Pop the Region's Telecom Bubble, WASH. POST, July 1, 2002, at
El (discussing WorldCom scandal); Christopher Stem, Worldcom Fights on 2 Fronts;
Investigations into Accounting Practices Compound Firm's Fiscal Troubles, WASH. POST,
July 23, 2002, at El (discussing WorldCom scandal), serves as a reminder of the power
private individuals and entities wield.
72 Subject matter restrictions can be more effective when defined in relation to particular
activities. For instance, some statutes prohibit consideration of genetic information or HIV-
positive status with regard to employment decisions. Similarly, some matters maybe deemed
irrelevant for purposes ofcompiling consumer credit histories. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL
SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 202-03 (1988); TURKNGTON &
ALLEN, supra note 108, at 351. Subject matter restrictions on general public discussion will
likely run afoul of the First Amendment. For example, the Florida statute struck down in
Florida Star v. B.JF., 491 .S. 524 (1989), attempted to remove from public discussion
particular individuals' victimization as a result of sexual assault. See id. at 526.
"1 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
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publication of private facts claim. Haynes had abused Daniels. By the time a book
was published describing the abuse, twenty years had passed, and Haynes had
remarried and become an exemplary person, even becoming Deacon of his church.
However, Haynes' abuse of his prior wife illustrated a larger trend that the
offending book's author had sought to describe - namely the widespread familial
dysfunction attendant the migration of five million African-Americans from the
rural South to the Northern cities between 1940 and 1970 (a movement termed the
Great Black Migration).'74
As a result of the courts' frequent recognition that nominally private
information can have public importance, few publication of private facts suits
succeed. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized just this sort of problem during its
early efforts to craft constitutional limitations on defamation. The Court had to
decide when heightened New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' 17 protection would protect
speakers against defamation lawsuits. In the Court's view, such protection ensured
that debate on public issues would be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'' 76
However, the Court refused to premise protection on the "public" nature of the
issues discussed, and instead focused on the "public" nature of the allegedly
defamed individual. Applying the New York Times v. Sullivan standard any time
an allegedly defamatory statement regarded a public issue would unduly curtail
defamation liability because virtually any statement could be viewed as one
regarding a matter of public interest. 177
114 See id. at 1232-33. In a defamation case, information about a couple's relationship
and the death of their son was deemed a matter of public importance. The husband's transfer
from a mental institution to a nursing home illustrated a broader trend regarding the effects
of a government deinstitutionalization program, and his was a matter of public concern. The
cause of his initial institutionalization (allegedly because his wife's affair with another man
and their son's consequent suicide) was relevant to the story. See Gaeta v. N.Y. News, Inc.,
465 N.E.2d 802-06 (N.Y. 1984); see also Huggins v. Moore, 726 N.E.2d 456,460-61 (N.Y.
1999) ("[O]ur cases establish that a matter may be of public concern even though it is a
'human interest' portrayal of events in the lives of persons who are not themselves public
figures, so long as some theme of legitimate public concern can reasonably be drawn from
their experience.").
17' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'16 Id. at 270.
'77 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345-46 (1974); see also Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79-80 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that "all
human events are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern' and noting that the
newsworthiness defense to the publication of private facts common-law tort cause of action
"rais[es] serious questions whether it has substantially destroyed the right of privacy as
Warren and Brandeis envisioned it"); Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (I1. 1975)
("Whether a matter is one of public interest... depends to some degree on whether the
media themselves have chosen to make it one."); Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 398 N.W.2d
245, 266 & n.28 (Mich. 1986) (observing that "'public interest' is an elusive term, and may
be said to include any matter reported on by the media," and quoting Theodore H. White's
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. In sum, subject matter approaches currently offer little protection for privacy
in general and thus offers little protection against undercover operations and their
consequences. Moreover, even a robust subject-matter based approach would not
remedy the deceptive access undercover techniques accomplish - which often is
itself an affront to privacy.
E. Confidential Relationships as a Mode of Privacy
Privacy protections could secure privacy by precluding people in whom citizens
confide from divulging their confidences. For instance, society might impose upon
medical personnel a duty keep confidential the information they obtain about
patients in the course of rendering care. Similarly, banking records could be, and
indeed are,178 protected by laws prohibiting bank officials from divulging account
information to government or private individuals in all but limited circumstances.
The scope of such privacy rights against prospective private intruders does not turn
on subject matter considerations like "relevance," which play a central role in the
subject matter mode of privacy analysis outlined above. Even if a customer's
account information has great relevance to the customer's fitness for a political
office he seeks, the bank cannot divulge the information. Conversely, if a person
obtains account information without breaching the protected bank-customer
relationship (by finding the depositors misplaced checkbook), he does not violate
bank secrecy laws by publishing such information.'79 Neither, ordinarily, will the
scope of legally enforceable privacy expectations associated with confidential
relationships turn on issues of physical location, means of intrusion, or means of
communication. ' 0
observation about "the power of the press to set the agenda of public discussion"); Harry
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966):
[S]urely there is force to the simple contention that whatever is in the news
media is by definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be
the final arbiter of newsworthiness. The cases admittedly do not go quite this
far, but they go far enough to decimate the tort.
178 See, e.g., Suburban Trust Co. v. Wailer, 408 A.2d 758, 764-65 (1979).
179 A separate common law cause of action for publication of private facts might lie. Such
an action would probably fail if some legitimate reason for public disclosure exists, and,
particularly when the depositor is a public official or public figure such a legitimate reason
can likely be established.
,so Granted a court may consider such issues, but probably in the context of deciding
whether the information imparted from one confidant to another was ever confidential in the
first place. In particular, a court may consider such factors in determining whether the
confider waived their his right to confidentiality. The location of a conversation between
priest and penitent might have relevance to the confidentiality of a the communication
between the two. If it occurred in a public place within earshot of others, the penitent's
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American jurisdictions generally do not protect privacy by ensuring the
confidentiality of information imparted in the context of a confidential relationship
- that is, jurisdictions rarely focus on relationships as a critical mode of privacy
protection. Formal evidentiary privileges, such as spousal, attorney-client, priest-
penitent, doctor-patient, journalist-source, do, of course, protect privacy by
imposing obligations of silence upon participants in those relationships. Some
testimonial privileges rest, at least in part, on a constitutional basis, forming an
integral part of the exercise of a particular constitutional right. The lawyer-client 8'
and priest-penitent'82 privileges serve as good examples of such quasi-constitutional
testimonial privileges.' Some privileges, like the marital communications
privilege, operate bilaterally, both parties to the relationship can preclude the other
from breaching their confidences. Most, however, operate unilaterally, the
obligations of confidentiality run in only one direction. Evidentiary privileges
associated with professional relationships are usually unilateral, only the client's
confidences, not those of the professional, receive protection."8 4
Undercover techniques could theoretically defeat these relationship-based
privacy protections as they defeat location-based and means-of-communication-
based privacy protections. Thus, the courts could hold that confidential informants
or undercover agents who manage to convince investigative targets to reveal
information by purporting to enter into a privileged or otherwise confidential
statements to the clergyman would not qualify as confidential, because others were privy to
it. See generally JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 74, at 104 (4th ed.
1992) ("[M]ost modem decisions do no more than hold that a privilege will not protect
communications made under circumstances in which interception was reasonably to be
anticipated.").
181 Ordinarily, a law enforcement agent's attendance of a meeting between attorney and
client, either surreptitiously or by invocation of the government's coercive powers, would
violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel - the ability to speak with counsel
confidentially constituting a crucial aspect of that right. See, e.g., Coplon v. United States,
191 F.2d 749, 757-59 (D.C. Cir. 1951); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
306-07 (1966) (assuming Coplon was correctly decided). See generally Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 563 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing lower court rulings to
support the proposition that "the essence of the Sixth Amendment right is... privacy of
communication with counsel") (quoting United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d
Cir. 1973)) (omission in original).
182 See generally Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?: Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV.
723, 793-821 (1987).
183 With respect to the provision of family planning services, the doctor-patient privilege
may also have a constitutional dimension. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
883-84 (1992) (plurality opinion).
184 The journalist-source privilege is a bit unusual. Though only the source's confidences
are privileged, the journalist can interpose the privilege even if the source consents to
disclosure. See id. § 76.2, at 110.
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relationship with them, could disclose such "confidences" in seeking to enforce
criminal or regulatory laws. Courts could hold that such unfortunate investigative
targets lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy in the information imparted to
the undercover operative.
However, in the marital context, courts held that one spouse does not lose the
marital communications privilege because the other surreptitiously allows a third
party to eavesdrop, even though, ordinarily, spouses lose the marital
communications privilege if third parties, even eavesdroppers, are privy to the
conversation."8 5 In State v. Lively,'86 the Washington Supreme Court held that a
confidential informant could not attend alcoholics/narcotics anonymous meetings
to identify drug addicts who continued selling illegal drugs."8 7 (While
communications between participants in an alcoholics or narcotics anonymous
program are not covered by a formal evidentiary privilege in most jurisdictions, 8'
the relationship between the participants is a confidential one.) Except in the most
critical circumstances, courts may well prohibit undercover operatives from
breaching such privileged relationships.'89
Many observers argue that law enforcement officers should be precluded from
assuming roles that require them to enter into confidential relationships with
185 See United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 947-49 (D. Colo. 1982); People v.
Dubanowski, 394 N.E.2d 605, 606-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Hunter v. Hunter, 83 A.2d 401,
403-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951). See generally STRONG ETAL, supra note 180, § 74, at 103-04
(stating that the general rule, allowing an eavesdropper to testify regarding privileged
conversations, has rarely been extended to situations where a party to the conversation makes
the eavesdropping possible). For an interesting incident involving one spouse surreptitiously
electronically recording a conversation with the other spouse and a priest, after notifying the
priest of his intentions, see Adam Liptak, Woman Sues Priest Over Secret Tape-Recording
Used in Custody Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, § I, at 14.
186 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996).
187 Id. at 1046, 1048-49. The case was decided on due process grounds rather than on
Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at 1049.
-188 See Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential
Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 693,
700-01 (1996).
'89 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1977). Weatherford allowed
breach of attorney-client communications, but only on condition that the undercover
operative who attended a privileged meeting between the target and his lawyer not report on
the meeting. Id.. Infiltration of churches has been allowed, but the contested cases do not
appear to have involved revelation ofprotected communications between penitent and cleric.
See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696-705 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
undercover agents attending and recording church meetings did not need a warrant); see also
Michael F. McCarthy, Note, Expanded Fourth Amendment Coverage: Protection from
Government Infiltration of Churches, 3 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing
Operation Sojourner, in which the INS used an informant to infiltrate a church and obtain
evidence regarding alien smuggling activity).
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investigative targets. 90 The FBI guidelines governing undercover operations, while
not absolutely precluding the use of confidential relationships, require agents to
meet more demanding standards to secure approval for investigations that require
undercover officers to enter into a confidential relationship.' 9 ' Similarly, Public
Health Service regulations governing the agency's drug treatment programs subject
undercover operations to demanding scrutiny and preclude the use of such
techniques altogether when law enforcement officials are investigating possible
criminal activity by patients. Undercover techniques may be used only to
investigate misdeeds of Public Health Service employees, as they are not protected
by the doctor-patient privilege, but law enforcement must nevertheless satisfy the
stringent Public Health Service regulations regarding undercover operations.'
Many confidential relationships have no corresponding formal evidentiary
privilege. The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment analysis produces particularly
devastating effects in such circumstances. The Court essentially grants law
enforcement most-favored-nation status. It allows law enforcement to obtain any
information that any private party could acquire, even a private party privy to
information an individual does not reveal to the general public. Thus, in United
States v. Miller,'93 the Court held that acquisition of banking records did not
constitute a "search," explaining that such conduct breached no legitimate
expectation of privacy. In the Court's view, a depositor who shared financial
information with his bank could have no legitimate expectation that law
enforcement officials would not thereby gain access to the information. If a person
exposes information to at least one other person, he assumes the risk of exposing
that information to law enforcement."4
190 Several commentators have suggested that courts employ a different, higher level of
scrutiny in evaluating undercover operations that require the investigator to establish an
intimate relationship with the target of the investigation. See e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A
Linguistic Analysis of the Meaning of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 576-77 (1988); William J. Stuntz, WaivingRights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 791-94 (1989). See generally MARX, supra note
8, at 147-52 (discussing examples of police tactics involving the establishment of intimate
relationships with suspects).
'"I FBI GUIDELINES, supra note 144, at 7.
'92 See 42 C.F.R. § 2.67(a), (e) (2001).
' 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
194 Such reasoning provided the basis for the controversial Terrorism Information and
Prevention System (TIPS) program proposed by the Attorney General. Law enforcement
officers would encourage public utility employees to report suspicious items they observe
during the course of their daily work-related routines. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATION
TIPS FACT SHEET (2002), available at http://www.policeforum.org/tips.htm. Congress
explicitly banned the program when it established the new Department ofHomeland Security.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 880, 116 Stat. 2135, 2245. The
controversy surrounding the program and Congress' swift reaction perhaps demonstrates the
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Indeed, at least on a theoretical level, Supreme Court doctrine is even more
troubling. In cases like United States v. Miller, the Court purports to apply the
principle that the police are entitled to any information available to the general
public. The logic of the Court's holdings in such cases suggests that once an
individual provides information to a confidant, no legally enforceable privacy
principle precludes that confidant from revealing that information to any member
of the general public, ajournalist, or the public at large.'95 Theoretically, the Court
does not recognize any variation of a person's legitimate expectations of privacy
based on the identity of the intruder. Accordingly, citizens have no greater
expectation of privacy against the police (operating without a warrant and/or
probable cause or the equivalent) than they do against journalists or any member of
the public who happens to take an interest in them.
In practice, the situation is far less grim. While the Court claims to refer to
general expectations of privacy in determining the scope of legitimate expectations
of privacy vis-a-vis law enforcement, it really defines the general expectation of
privacy vis-a-vis law enforcement based on its own balancing of the needs of law
enforcement and privacy. The Court does not appear to take seriously any evidence
indicating the public's actual judgment about the level of privacy expectations
society should consider reasonable.9 6  Moreover, the Court's holding that
power of the physical location mode of privacy analysis. At least as the public understood
the program, most of the reporting done under the TIPS program would regard private
residences, which receives the highest protection under the traditional location-based
analysis.
195 This approach suggests that privacy is indivisible; we have privacy against everyone,
or we have it against no one. This is counter to our intuitions. See Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 489 U.S. 656 (1989):
Moreover, expectations of privacy in a particular activity do not exist on an all-
or-none basis. An individual, for example, may freely admit guests to his home
without relinquishing the right to bar others or may open the curtains ofhis home
to the view of unenhanced vision without consenting to the view of a telescope.
Similarly, even the individual who willingly urinates in the presence of another
does not "'reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making...
discover[y of] the personal physiological secrets it holds' possible.
Id. at 175 (quoting Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986)
(quoting McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'das modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)) (omission and alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see
also Bell, supra note 11, at 764 (examining the logic of this all-or-nothing reasoning).
196 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy andAutonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An EmpiricalLookat "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society, "42 DuKE L.J. 727, 774-75 (1993). Thus, in finding
no reasonable expectation ofprivacy in garbage placed in opaque bags for disposal, the Court
disregarded a municipal ordinance that made such snooping illegal. See California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (explicitly rejecting the approach that expectations of
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depositors lacked an expectation of privacy in their banking records did not leave
citizens powerless to guard such records from private snoops. The Court would
rarely, if ever, have occasion to apply its own Fourth Amendment anemic
conception of the reasonable expectation of privacy to claims against private
intruders.197
Nevertheless, in the criminal context (and theoretically in the private context)
the Court has held that banks can turn over banking records to snoops. Similarly,
communication attributes available to the phone company could be obtained by pen
registers.'98 The Supreme Court failed to recognize bank-customer or utility-
customer relationships as confidential relationships, but they are.
A recognition that a confidential relationship may exist despite the absence of
an evidentiary privilege need not require empowering individuals to preclude their
confidants from testifying in all but a few limited circumstances, as is the case when
an evidentiary privilege applies. Rather, the court need only recognize that a
legitimate expectation of privacy exists and thus merely require law enforcement
officials to either make the showing required to obtain a warrant or advance some
regulatory exception to the warrant requirement before allowing government
officials to breach those confidential relationships. Certainly law enforcement
officers should be required to make a showing of either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause before deceptively entering into a confidential relationship to obtain
information from a suspect.'99
On the civil side, British courts have established a cause of action for breach of
privacy are determined by ordinance or other local positive law or custom). The Court could
adopt a different attitude toward the public's views regarding expectations of privacy that
should be considered legitimate. It could incorporate privacy rights reflected in state laws,
regulations, and custom in performing its Fourth Amendment analysis as to the legitimacy
ofparticular expectations ofprivacy. The Court has adopted such an approach when defining
"property" for purposes of its procedural due process analysis. Bell, supra note 11, at
774-75.
117 In the context of civil claims against banks for breach of confidentiality, state courts
have found that account holders enjoy an expectation of privacy that imposes upon banks
legally enforcable obligations to keep information confidential. Suburban Trust Co. v.
Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 367 P.2d 284,290 (Idaho 1961); Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank of Eng.,
1 K.B. 461 (1923).
'98 These particular rulings have been limited legislatively. Bell, supra note 11, at 794-95
& nn.222-23.
"' Indeed, Congress essentially took steps in this direction in enacting the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-1122, 92 Stat. 3641,
3697-3710 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000)), governing confidential banking
records, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), governing the use of pen registers
and similar devices to obtain communications attributes. Of course, in those statutes
Congress imposed a far less demanding standard than that suggested above.
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confidence.2"0 However, that cause of action was not successfully transplanted in
the United States."' Several writers have suggested a greater emphasis on breach
of confidence cause of action and laid out their proposals for a breach of confidence
action in American jurisdiction.2" 2
Such a cause of action would surmount the consent defense typically raised by
those who engage in deceit and cabin use of undercover techniques. Moreover,
such an approach, focusing on the relationships with people to whom we divulge
information, fits our intuitions that some relationships warrant more protection than
others (and that privacy is not an interest individuals have either with respect to
everyone or no one).2" 3 The relationship between a cab driver and his fare, between
two close personal friends, between a bank and a depositor differ dramatically in
terms of privacy expectations. Privacy legislation increasingly focuses on limiting
dissemination of records held by entities that have certain relationships with
individuals, creating a type of confidentiality between them. For example, federal
statutes and regulations limit video rental stores, doctors, and educational
institutions from divulging their patrons' records."° Courts could impose civil
liability upon journalists and other public citizens who establish or use certain
relationships to obtain a person's confidences.
I have discussed the confidential relationship mode of privacy analysis in terms
of protecting information individuals entrust to others. Moreover, the discussion
has focused primarily on commercial relationships. However, private non-
commercial associations play a critical role in individuals' mental health and
enhance their autonomy. The Supreme Court has recognized the critical importance
of private associations, even those that, unlike religious institutions, receive no
explicit recognition in the Constitution.2"5 The Court has observed: "[C]ertain
200 Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedyfor Invasions
ofPrivacy, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 1,9-15 (1995); G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality:
A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2395-97 (1992);
Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1426,
1453-54 (1982).
20 American courts have generally not adopted such a broad cause of action. But see
Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894). Gilles also notes that some
breach of confidence actions have been recognized in California and New York, and
decisions in other states have suggested possible receptiveness. These actions, however,
have largely involved fiduciary relationships or commercial arrangements. Gilles, supra note
200, at 53-58. See generally, DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §§ 5:-5:3 (2002).
202 Gilles, supra note 200, at 76-83; Harvey, supra note 200, at 2422-49; Vickery, supra
note 200, at 1455-68.
203 See supra note 195.
204 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
205 In several cases defining First Amendment freedom of association, the Court has
recognized private associations as valuable and acknowledged that they merit some respect
from government. See Bd. of Dirs.. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
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kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and tradition of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the state."2 6 Accordingly, such groups should receive some protection from
infiltration. Thus private associations warrant protection not merely because a
particular member's confidences might otherwise be compromised, but also because
affording such protection will allow such associations to develop free from
government, or other outside, interference. In the undercover context, for instance,
this interest might at least serve to bar third parties from using deceit to infiltrate
groups.
Several considerations, however, suggest the need for caution in recognizing
relationships as confidential in a way that both precludes others from
disingenuously forming such relationships with targets in order to gain information,
and prohibits those who sincerely entered such relationships from later deciding to
disclose information gained during the relationship.
First, to the extent there is a sincere relationship followed by a falling out
between confidant and confider, a robust confidentiality doctrine could severely
constrain the confidant's own freedom of self-expression regarding significant
aspects of her own life. 7 Recall Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,208 a case
discussed earlier. As noted earlier, journalist Nicolas Lemann's The Promised
545-46 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460-61 (1958). Courts have recognized associational rights even
when doing so frustrates attainment of goals of the highest order, such as ending racial and
gender discrimination. Indeed, some have raised the threat that undercover operations pose
to freedom of association as a basis for declaring undercover techniques violative of the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,762-65 (197 1) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,
612-13 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting); FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 4,47 (1981) (testimony of Geoffrey R. Stone and Gary T. Marx).
20" Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 93 (1996); ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
207 Jack Dolan, Bridgeport HospitalDrops Suit, THEHARTFORDCOURANT, July 27,2002,
at A l ("How can you prevent somebody from talking about what happened to their dead
spouse? An agreement like that would never be valid."); Jim Dwyer & Ford Fessenden, Lost
Voices of Firefighters, Some on the 78th Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at Al:
The department has identified the voices of at least 16 firefighters [who died on
September 11, 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center] on the tape,
and... their families were invited to listen to it [but were first] required to sign
a statement.. .saying they would not disclose the last words of their husbands,
brothers and sons.
208 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Land, a book about the Great Black Migration used the relationship between two
ordinary people caught up in that movement, Ruby Lee Daniels and Luther Haynes,
to illustrate the author's themes. Haynes, who had, by the time of the books'
publication, turned his life around, was described as a hard-drinking, abusive ne'er-
do-well. This account came from Daniels, whose description of her experiences
included very intimate details of the couple's marriage." 9 Had Haynes been able
to sue Daniels for breach of confidence, rather than bring the suit he brought for
disclosure of private facts against the book's publisher, Daniels would have been
precluded from describing defining moments of her own life essential to the
development of her own personality."0
Such concerns are hardly fanciful. Some celebrities require their spouses to
sign confidentiality agreements.2 ' Such agreements can potentially prohibit the
spouse from recounting not only purely titillating matters, but also wrongs done to
them in the course of the relationship.
Perhaps this objection could be overcome by crafting a defense to any breach
of confidence cause of action. In other contexts, confidentiality obligations do not
prohibit the confidant from revealing a confidence to protect his own "superior"
interest. Thus an attorney may reveal a confidence in defending a malpractice
action. 2 Perhaps that principle could provide provide the basis for an exception
to confidentiality obligations that allows confidants to breach confidences, when
necessary, to either comment on wrongs done to them or recount defining elements
of their life story.
Second, to the extent a real relationship existed at some point, confidentiality
obligations place unfair strains on the confidant, who may have conflicting duties
or who may merely not wish to become complicit in wrongdoing. For instance,
recently a Catholic priest bound by the seal of the confessional revealed that for a
period of several years he could not provide authorities with information that would
have freed an innocent person from incarceration." 3 A more prominent figure,
209 Id. at 1224-25.
210 Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 164 (1999) ("Feminists
have warned that to advocate privacy aggressively is to advocate that men be allowed the
freedom to subordinate women behind closed doors."); see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 96-102 (1987) ("When the law of
privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars change in control over that intimacy.");
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 108, at 15.
211 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 265-66 (1998).
22 MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2002); RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f
(1958) ("An agent is privileged to reveal information confidentially acquired by him in the
course of his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or of a third person.").
2"3 See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that a
priest and lawyer could not reveal the confession of a person to a crime for which two other
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Jeffrey Wigand, faced a similar dilemma. Wigand concluded that the tobacco
company for which he formerly worked had concealed its knowledge of nicotine's
harmful effects. However, a confidentiality agreement Wigand had signed, as a
condition of employment, when he first joined the company precluded him from
disclosing such information, which he believed had significant public importance." 4
Surely society should not widely impose upon citizens such traumatic dilemmas.
Third, widely applicable confidentiality obligations would harm the public
interest. In particular, they would endanger the autonomy of others who should be
able to make fully informed decisions about whether and on what terms to interact
with others." 5 The controversy regarding sealed settlements or sealed discovery
materials in products liability cases illustrates this problem. 16 Such concerns have
recently led the American Bar Association to amend its model rules of ethics to give
attorneys greater discretion to breach confidentiality when their client's conduct
poses the risk of life-threatening injury to others." 7
Fourth, a confidentiality obligation (or at least a ban on the use of deception in
interacting with others) would prevent individuals from protecting themselves. The
people and entities with whom we deal may act duplicitously and treat us unfairly
individuals were being incarcerated).
214 In Wigand's case the issue was not Wigand's unwillingness to breach his
confidentiality agreement and disclose his former employer's "confidences"- he was all too
willing, but rather whether his employer could sue media entities for inducing Wigand's
breach of contract. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 643 N.Y.S.2d 92
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
215 See generally Garfield, supra note 211, at 294-343.
216 See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at Al. See generally Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The
Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283
(1999).
217 Sarah Boxer, Lawyers Are Asking, How Secret Is a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2001, at B7. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002) ("A lawyer
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm.. . ."), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) ("A lawyer may
.reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary ... to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. .. ."). Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a psychotherapist who has determined that his
patient presents a serious danger of violence to another has a duty to use reasonable care to
protect the intended victim); Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that physicians who learned after surgery that transfused blood was
HIV-contaminated owed duty to timely warn patient of danger so as to protect third parties
from infection); Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (holding that physician had duty




and unlawfully. Government will not protect citizens against unfairness short of
illegality and does not have the resources to protect us even against all unlawful
conduct. In addition, if the government devoted the resources and employed the
intrusive techniques needed to protect citizens from pervasive duplicity, citizens
might well find the government's efforts unduly intrusive and oppressive. In other
words, the pervasiveness of such a government presence would itself be
undesirable. Given the constraints on government and the private duplicity that
citizens must confront, citizens must be free to engaged in some deception ensure
themselves that they are being treated fairly and according to law.
Fifth, a confidentiality obligation, if very broad or inclusive of a wide variety
of relationships, may involve the government in trivialities. An individual's minor
betrayals of his or her friends' or co-workers' confidences may become lawsuits
that must be resolved in court. Legal claims arising out of such common indignities
might potentially burden the courts. Moreover, in resolving such cases, courts may
have to permit discovery and public discussion of the relationship between the
parties that gave rise to the confidentiality obligations. Thus, civil litigation could
lead to even greater privacy breaches than allowing minor betrayals of trust to go
unpunished.218
In short, the confidential relationship mode of privacy analysis has been
underutilized in the United States. Constitutional doctrine has systematically
ignored relationships between confiders and confidants, treating privacy
expectations as ones individuals have equally vis-a-vis all potential intruders. Civil
causes of action for breach of confidentiality have not been widely recognized.
218 This problem may explain one note writer's suggestion that breach of confidentiality
actions lie only to enforce written confidentiality agreements. Such an approach suffers from
two problems. First, it would provide protection only be introducing an unfortunate formality
into some informal relationship. In some informal relationships the parties implicitly
understand each has a obligation of confidentiality to the other. (Such an understanding may
be reflected in societal custom or the mutual behavior of the parties involved.) Under the
rule, such confidences are protected only if the parties have executed a written agreement.
For instance, should those who share sexual intimacies first have to execute a confidentiality
agreement before any obligation ofconfidentiality arises? A refusal to permit confidentiality
obligations from arising by implication is particularly troubling in the undercover context.
Such a rule would mean that the legally savvy might extract written promises of
confidentiality while the untutored would not, even though both were engaged in the same
type of relationship with an undercover operative.
Second, it is unfair to allow a person to impose confidentiality on another without first
disclosing the confidence to be revealed. The confidant may expect toreceive an innocuous
confidence and instead receive a confidence that she feels compelled to disclose to avoid
complicity in wrongdoing, satisfy a higher duty to someone else, or tell the story of her own
life. Needless to say, from the perspective of the public, conferring such a power on
individuals to demand that their confidants not disclose those confidences could prove
detrimental, by, for example, precluding the public from obtaining critical information.
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Wider recognition of such a cause of action might constrain some potentially
offensive uses of deception. There are, however, valid reasons for caution in
recognizing relationships as having accompanying legal obligations of
confidentiality.
F. Databases as a Hybrid Mode of Privacy
A sixth privacy protection mode warrants recognition. Even though it
incorporates other modalities of protecting privacy and is in some sense, then, an
amalgam of previously discussed modalities, it is often the modality adopted in
privacy legislation. In particular, privacy can be protected by protecting the
databases from breach by third parties and precluding database custodians from
disclosing stored information without consent.
Database protection is a type of location-based protection. By keeping
particular records sacrosanct, the privacy of the subjects of that data are protected.
The information is protected only against disclosure as a result of the breach of the
database - if discovered by some other means it is not protected. However, unlike
the modality of physical location, and more like the modality of the means of
communication, the important aspect of the database is not its physical location.
Rather, the database really has a virtual location.
The database mode of privacy analysis shares some characteristics of the
confidential relationship mode of analysis. Database protection is largely
accomplished by controlling the custodian of the database, who generally has a
relationship with the subject of the record. Database protection is also related to the
subject-matter mode of privacy protection. Legislatures protect databases because
of the subject matter they contain. Indeed, the statutory protection may focus on
particular subject matter within the database. In particular, the legislation is based
on the concept that certain types of information should not be made public without
an individual's consent. These types of information include the selection of
videotapes they rent,2" 9 and the public library books they borrow, 220 as well as
information provided in connection with driver's licenses,22 ' educational records222,
and e-mail account records. 23 Thus, though database protection can be viewed as
2"9 The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 10-618, 102 Stat. 3195
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710).
220 See supra note 128.
22' Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725).
222 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).
223 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2000); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215,219 (D.D.C. 1998)
(finding military discharge proceedings for homosexual conduct based on the
servicemember's anonymous email account profile to be a violation of the Electronic
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location based (albeit the location is merely a virtual one) it is not as imprecise or
indiscriminate as the classic location-based approaches that focus on protecting a
particular physical locations, like residences. Rather it offers targeted protection
for particular types of information.
Database protection is generally not defeated by undercover techniques. (It may
be, however, generally susceptible to breach by law enforcement authorities and
regulators using subpoenas, particularly grantjury subpoenas.) Database custodians
would probably not easily succumb to undercover tactics, and those who establish
certain relationships using undercover tactics would presumably still be constrained
by the relevant statutory obligations. However, because the same information can
be obtained from the person to whom the records relate by, among other things,
using undercover techniques, database protection does not protect citizens against
undercover operations. However, requiring potential intruders to engage in
undercover operations against the subject of the information, rather than merely
obtaining the information from the records custodian itself, may enhance privacy.
Many of the concerns about records organizations maintain on individuals relate to
the secondary use of that information and the combination of that information with
other information.
CONCLUSION
White-collar crime often involves deception. Sometimes a potent means to
uncover the deception, either to punish wrongdoers or to allow others to obtain the
information they need to exercise autonomy, is more deception. As noted above,
not only do law enforcement officers employ deceptive undercover techniques, but
so do a variety of other actors, including administrative agencies, news
organizations, and private citizens. We have yet, however, to fully address the
privacy implications of the use of deception involved in undercover operations.
Indeed, we have more generally had limited success at precisely defining the
appropriate sphere or privacy.
As I have suggested in this paper, our analysis of privacy focuses on particular
modes of privacy, each of which captures some aspect of privacy by misses others.
The dominant modes of judicial protection of privacy, the physical location and
subject matter modalities have proven somewhat problematic in general. They have
been even more ineffectual in addressing the substantial privacy implications of
undercover investigation. Other modes of privacy, focusing on interpersonal
relationships, the means of communication, and the means of privacy intrusion,
warrant consideration with regard to addressing the implications of undercover
operations, and more generally, the dilemmas we face in seeking to secure an
appropriate realm of privacy.
Communications Privacy Act).
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